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The 2005 Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice report Defining Law 
Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism was used as 
a framework for analyzing the State of Florida’s capabilities for preparing and responding 
to an agroterrorism attack. A series of desired capabilities were developed from the 
report’s conclusions and recommendations, and research was conducted to establish 
Florida law enforcement’s current capabilities. From these two points of reference, gap 
analysis identified the deficiencies in Florida’s capabilities.  
Research and analysis found Florida’s preparation capability gaps revolve around 
a general lack of intelligence and information sharing focused on the agriculture sector. 
The key recommendation is creation of a state agriculture intelligence and analysis unit 
interacting with the fusion centers, critical infrastructure protection program, and the food 
and agriculture sector. Florida’s response capabilities were found to be quite robust. Gaps 
found in the area of response could be closed with relatively minor policy and strategy 
enhancements.   
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The food and agriculture sector is one of the United States’ most important critical 
infrastructures, with agriculture and agribusiness related industries employing over 16 
million Americans and representing 4.8 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product 
according to the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. 
Agriculture is a tremendous contributor to American prosperity and the American way of 
life. Unfortunately, this vital industry exists every day under a looming threat. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation has referred to agriculture as among the most vulnerable 
and least protected of all potential targets of terrorism. 
Acts of terrorism targeting the food and agriculture industry are referred to as 
Agroterrorism, a relatively new term that first began to appear in the literature around 
2000. Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism because the means of attack would most 
likely involve use of a biological agent such as a plant or animal disease. The James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies has catalogued 23 occurrences of chemical or biological weapon incidents 
targeting agriculture between 1915 and 2008, of which 19 are defined as acts of 
agroterror. The literature and subject-matter experts are in near total agreement that the 
most likely scenario for an agroterrorism attack in the U.S. would be the intentional 
introduction of a foreign animal disease such as foot-in-mouth disease to livestock. There 
are numerous naturally occurring disease outbreaks from around the world to examine for 
prevention, response, and consequence issues. Economic damage from these outbreaks 
has cost in the tens of billions of dollars. 
A review of the literature reveals a myriad of current issues in agroterrorism being 
researched, analyzed, and discussed by academics and practitioners alike. Despite the 
topic of agroterrorism having obvious direct links to terrorism, homeland security, and 
criminal justice, very little is found in the literature concerning law enforcement’s role in 
agroterrorism. In fact, other than a few small specific references to law enforcement-
related issues embedded in some papers, there is only one academic research study 
specifically focused on law enforcement and agroterrorism. This study resulted in the 
 xv 
2005 Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ) report Defining Law 
Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture From Agroterrorism. 
In this study, the NIJ commission established baseline data by surveying Kansas 
sheriffs and livestock industry stakeholders about agro and bio terrorism and studying the 
complexities of agro-movement. Recommendations were made for sweeping policy 
changes and new collaborative programs, which were enacted in Kansas. These included 
law enforcement intelligence networks, which included specific focus areas on 
agriculture, agriculture event response teams comprised of animal health experts and 
criminal investigators, forensic evidence procedures for animal events, interaction with 
the community and industry through the AgroGuard program, collaboration with USDA 
via their Smuggled Food Interdiction Teams, and new agroterrorism training initiatives 
for law enforcement, animal health professionals, livestock industry stakeholders, and the 
community. 
The authors of the NIJ study reached a series of conclusions and 
recommendations regarding law enforcement’s role in defending against agroterrorism 
and what enhancement steps should be taken. The conclusions and recommendations 
from the NIJ study became the basis for this thesis. As the only academic study of its type 
in existence, The NIJ study and findings were taken as a framework for what law 
enforcement’s roles and capabilities should be in defending against agroterrorism. This 
framework was used to analyze Florida law enforcement’s capabilities after a Florida 
assessment was conducted. The analysis revealed gaps in Florida’s capabilities, and 
recommendations to fill these gaps were developed. 
Many of the specific recommendations outlined in the NIJ study were directed at 
the federal government and were, thus, outside the scope of this thesis. Findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations from the study focusing on the state and local level 
had potential applicability to Florida. The following questions were developed from the 
study to analyze Florida law enforcement’s capacity to accomplish their roles and 
responsibilities in the prevention and response to agroterrorism: 
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• Is there a strategy for identifying threats to, and assessing the vulnerability
of, the agriculture community in Florida?
• Does the capacity exist in Florida to effectively collect, analyze, and
disseminate agriculture related information and intelligence?
• Is there a community policing strategy in the Florida agriculture
community?  NIJ212280 recommends the Agro-Guard model.
• In the event of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) event response, does the
capacity exist to simultaneously handle the animal health related issues, as
well as manage crime scene and evidentiary requirements and conduct a
criminal investigation, if required. NIJ212280 recommends establishment
of a rapid response team (RRT).
• Does Florida law enforcement possess the capacity to enforce quarantines 
and stop movement plans in the event of an FAD event?
• Does Florida engage in the interdiction of illegally imported and possibly
contaminated food products?  NIJ212280 recommends establishment of a
SFIT.
• Are agroterrorism trainings available and/or being delivered to Florida law
enforcement?
In the course of researching for the Florida assessment, several organizations and 
programs were identified as having a primary role in this endeavor. Included among these 
were the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) and 
several sub-divisions and programs, including the Office of Agricultural Law 
Enforcement (OALE), Division of Animal Industry, Division of Food Safety, and the 
State Agricultural Response Team (SART). Also included at the state and regional levels 
were the Florida Fusion Center and the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. Local 
level involvement included Florida Sheriff’s Offices, primarily via the Florida 
Agriculture Crimes Intelligence Unit (FACIU). The functions of these entities and 
programs were analyzed within the context of the questions identified from the NIJ study 
to analyze Florida law enforcement’s capacity to accomplish their roles and 
responsibilities in the prevention and response to agroterrorism. 
In the context of the seven questions, the findings suggest that Florida was better 
prepared in the response categories and had some significant gaps in the prevention 
categories. The response related capabilities to be met included the capacity to respond to 
an FAD event and simultaneously handle the animal health related issues as well as 
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manage crime scene, evidentiary requirements, and conduction of criminal investigation, 
and quarantine enforcement capabilities. Florida already has many of the response 
recommendations from NIJ study in place and working. The element that is missing from 
Florida’s capabilities is having a law enforcement component intrinsic to their response.   
This missing element results in two gaps. First, there is no criminal investigation 
element as an intrinsic part of an animal disease response event. Second, there is no 
ability to immediately enforce quarantines, stop movements, and if needed, to enforce 
public order at the scene of the outbreak. The second element of law enforcement’s 
response capabilities in the NIJ212280 concerns quarantine and stop movement 
enforcement. The research found Florida has extensive capabilities and experience in 
enforcing agriculture quarantines, both at the state borders and within the state. These 
response gaps are not due to the lack of capability, but rather are gaps in policy and 
planning and thus easily remedied. 
Research and analysis into Florida law enforcement’s agroterrorism prevention 
capabilities found strengths as well as significant gaps. Some areas were identified in 
which solid prevention efforts have been taken, such as contaminated food interdiction. 
In fact, the research found that the existing food interdiction system in place now in 
Florida achieves the desired goals as outlined in the NIJ study, requiring no enhancement. 
However, there were also areas found with significant gaps, such as information and 
intelligence, threat and vulnerability assessments and agriculture community policing.   
Threat and vulnerability assessments in Florida are the purview of Critical 
Infrastructure Planners employed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and 
operating under the seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces. The assessments are 
conducted according to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) standards and using 
DHS web based tools and metrics. Based on available research it appears very little 
attention being paid to threats and vulnerabilities in the agriculture sector. 
Intelligence and information sharing specific to the food and agriculture industry 
was a much-discussed topic in the NIJ study, because there has typically been very little 
focus on this topic as compared to other homeland security intelligence issues. In Florida, 
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the primary means for collecting, disseminating and sharing criminal and domestic 
security information is via the state’s seven Fusion Centers, with the Tallahassee based 
Florida Fusion Center (FFC) as the primary hub. There are a number of analysts and 
agents assigned to the FFC who analyze, process, and formulate intelligence reports in 
and out of the center; however, the agriculture sector expertise available to the FFC is 
very limited.  
FDACS is in a prime position to collect agriculture information and intelligence 
with its regulatory bureaus in the field and its law enforcement branch. However, there is 
no known connection point between anyone in the regulatory bureaus and the fusion 
centers. OALE law enforcement members are linked to the fusion centers and OALE has 
an analyst linked with the fusion center. OALE does not have an agency intelligence and 
analysis component.   
OALE is Florida’s lead law enforcement agency for agriculture matters and could 
assume the lead role in agriculture intelligence and information. OALE could provide the 
unique interdisciplinary expertise combining criminal, terrorism, and agriculture 
perspectives for pointed analysis on information and intelligence flowing through the 
fusion centers as well as from other sources such as their sister bureaus in FDACS. There 
is a potential wealth of information on threats in the agriculture industry that could be 
gleaned from those non-sworn personnel working in the regulatory bureaus of FDACS 
who have regular contact with the food and agriculture sector, but have no tie in to the 
intelligence community. These are gaps in Florida’s intelligence and information sharing 
efforts. 
Florida does not have an agriculture community policing capability as described 
in NIJ212280. However, the organizations and processes are already in place that could 
be enhanced to achieve this capability. These existing mechanisms are the SART group 
and the FACIU. SART already exists as a partnership between FDACS and animal health 
through VetCore, the industry through dozens of group partnerships, and the community 
with thousands of affiliated volunteers and maintains a website that receives 40,000 hits 
per month. Sheriffs are highly important members of the law enforcement community in 
Florida and tend to have close ties with their communities. Many Sheriff’s Offices have 
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dedicated agriculture crimes units or deputies and many of these participate in the 
FACIU. The FACIU offers another excellent vehicle for creating an agriculture 
community policing effort. The FACIU is comprised of the law enforcement members 
that SART lacks, yet lacks the industry and community outreach that SART excels at.   
OALE is already active in the FACIU with all OALE investigators on the 
membership role. SART is also familiar to the FACIU, having participated in FACIU 
annual conferences providing training. There is no need to reinvent the wheel or create a 
new program from scratch in order to achieve the capabilities recommended by 
NIJ212280. What is needed is to combine the existing capabilities and infrastructure 
provided by SART, the FACIU and OALE and hopefully incorporate the new capabilities 
brought about with creation of an OALE intelligence unit and increased agricultural focus 
in the FFC.   
With the research into the Florida assessment completed, analysis identified gaps 
in Florida’s capabilities, and findings and conclusions reached, the final element was 
reaching recommendations. The recommendations for Florida to take in order to enhance 
law enforcement’s capabilities in defending agriculture against agroterrorism are as 
follows: 
• Create an intelligence and analysis unit within the Office of Agricultural Law 
Enforcement staffed with food and agriculture sector subject matter experts.  
o Assign a sector SME analyst from this unit to the Florida Fusion Center.   
o Assign a sworn investigator from this unit to the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force. 
o Unit responsibilities should include active engagement with the State 
Agriculture Response Team, the Florida Agriculture Crimes Intelligence 
Unit, and the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces to promote and 
facilitate interaction with the agriculture community and the exchange of 
information to identify threats to the food and agriculture sector. 
 
• Enact changes to Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
policies, standard operating procedures, and response plans for animal disease 
response events to incorporate an intrinsic criminal investigative and uniformed 
response component provided by the Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement.   
 
• Enact an Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement agroterrorism policy specifying 
the agencies roles and responsibilities in an agroterrorism event, as well as 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this research is to analyze Florida law enforcement’s role in the 
efforts to defend Florida agriculture from the risk of Agroterrorism, to determine the 
adequacy of these efforts, and identify any gaps or opportunities for improvement. This 
research will ask what the existing literature offers on the topic, what is status quo in 
Florida at this point in time, what is ideal or desired status to be achieved, and finally 
what needs to be accomplished to get there. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
To defend its vital agriculture industry the State of Florida has engaged in many 
efforts, especially taking steps to protect the most vulnerable aspects of the industry 
including livestock and the food supply chain. Some of these efforts include the Florida 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) divisions of Animal 
Industry and Food Safety, and the State Agricultural Response Team (SART). What has 
been missing in Florida’s efforts to protect agriculture is law enforcement’s integration 
into the preparation, defense, and response-planning framework. 
The largest single agency entity in Florida’s agriculture focused law enforcement 
community is the law enforcement division of the FDACS – the Office of Agricultural 
Law Enforcement (OALE), with nearly 250 sworn officers. OALE has no specific 
mission or focus on agroterrorism and in fact the term Agroterrorism does not appear 
anywhere in OALE policy.1 OALE has maintained focus over its statutory and policy 
defined core mission areas of regulating the movement of cargo and agriculture, 
enforcing laws pertaining to protection of agriculture and consumers, and supporting the 
department’s regulatory divisions. Local agriculture law enforcement units found in some 
sheriff’s offices are focused on agriculture crimes such as animal and equipment theft.  
1. Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, Written Directives, Tallahassee, FL,  2014 
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The SART team is a well-established, statewide Multi-Agency Coordination 
(MAC) group coordinated out of FDACS with the purpose of providing for an effective 
response to agriculture disasters in support of the Division of Animal Industry.2 SART is 
focused on agroterrorism as well as naturally occurring events. The DAI response 
protocols and SART response teams consist of every other subject matter expert needed 
to deal with a foreign animal disease outbreak with the exception of a law enforcement 
member who is experienced in and looking for indications a nefarious act may have 
occurred.3  If there is no investigative element at the outset of an outbreak the clues or 
evidence needed to connect the dots may be lost forever. 
Intelligence and information sharing is tremendously important to the nation’s 
homeland security as evidenced by the numerous terrorist plots foiled since 9/11. It is 
also a significant gap in Florida’s agroterrorism defense as there is no apparent tie in with 
intelligence and information sharing with anyone associated with Animal Industry, Food 
Safety, or SART.   
Other gaps exist which intertwine with those previously discussed. There is a lack 
of agroterrorism training focused on law enforcement’s roles and responsibilities. 
Outreach is needed from the law enforcement community to the agriculture community 
and industry stakeholders. Pre-incident planning by law enforcement for response to a 
large-scale agroterrorism event needs to be done to discuss how an expanding incident 
involving rapidly widening quarantine zones and mass animal eradications would be 
coped with. 
Arguably, Florida is probably ahead of most states in their domestic security 
planning and preparations. Florida is often the target for significant natural disasters such 
as major hurricanes and other large-scale events. Florida is heavily invested in pre-event 
planning, emergency management infrastructure and capabilities, and stored and staged 
resources. However, gaps exist, especially in the agriculture sector. The opportunity 
exists to identify those gaps pertaining to law enforcement’s role in defense of agriculture 
2. Joe Kight (Emergency Support Function-17, FDACS), in discussion with the author, November 6, 2013. 
3. Ibid. 
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and by building upon the networks and resources already in place these gaps could be 
shrunk with comparatively little increase in budgets or growth of bureaucracy.   
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Sample 
The research conducted its analysis based on one primary source, the National 
Institutes of Justice (NIJ) report and applied it to one sample, the agricultural and law 
enforcement policies in the State of Florida. The 2005 Department of Justice National 
Institute of Justice report:  Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American 
Agriculture from Agroterrorism addressed the level of engagement and capability where 
law enforcement should ideally be. The findings of this report serves as the model for law 
enforcement’s agroterrorism capabilities. The State of Florida was selected because it is 
the author’s sponsor agency, the Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, and thus the 
most relevant sample to the agency mission priorities. 
2. Selection 
The NIJ report selection derived from its status as the only academic study on law 
enforcement’s role in agroterrorism. In fact, the literature review found nearly no 
references to law enforcement and agroterrorism. The NIJ report stands as the 
authoritative standard on this topic. From the NIJ report the recommendations section 
was selected to serve as the model for law enforcement’s agroterrorism capabilities. The 
report includes recommendation on federal roles and capabilities, but those are irrelevant 
to the State of Florida, and are thus outside the scope of this research.  
Within the State of Florida, all entities or programs having responsibilities in the 
defense of or response to agroterrorism, as identified in the NIJ report recommendations, 
were selected for the thesis sample. Some of these entities or programs do not specifically 
identify a role in agroterrorism, however research into their responsibilities found 
alignment with the NIJ findings and recommendations. The Florida selections included 
the following entities and programs: 
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• Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
• Division of Animal Industry 
• State Agriculture Response Team 
• Division of Food Safety 
• Law Enforcement Entities 
• Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement 
• Regional Domestic Security Task Forces 
• Florida Agriculture Crimes Intelligence Unit 
• Florida Fusion Center 
3. Limits 
The research into the NIJ report is not an evaluative assessment of its results, 
rather a preparatory step towards using the NIJ framework and findings as an analytical 
framework for applying to Florida.  
4. Data Sources 
The data analyzed were pulled largely from primary sources including state 
statutes, departmental policies, exercise after action reports, and internal reports and 
records. Here too there is comparatively little information for review. Much of the 
required information resides only in the institutional knowledge held by subject matter 
experts. Classified material that may address threats to the agriculture industry or current 
or prospective programs to address the threat were not relied upon in this thesis.  
5. Types of Analysis 
A policy analysis method was used to evaluate Florida law enforcement’s role in 
agroterrorism. The findings of the NIJ report were analyzed for their potential application 
to the State of Florida. Each of the sample elements for the Florida Assessment were then 
analyzed to determine which, if any, of the elements of the NIJ report are in operation 
and if so, to what extent.  
A multi-goal analytical approach was used to develop recommendations for 
Florida. There are multiple variables in play, many of which are difficult if not 
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impossible to quantify. Criteria used to develop recommendations included cost, political 
ramifications or level of political acceptability required, legal and policy issues, and of 
course the projected effectiveness. Funding is a critical factor in developing 
recommendations. The political climate in Florida in recent years has favored cuts rather 
than growth in government programs. Using existing infrastructures to mitigate new costs 
was one of the primary factors in developing recommendations. Political ramifications 
and acceptability is always a factor in state government and can be difficult to quantify. 
Recommendations were designed to incorporate existing programs and entities in 
partnerships to enhance capabilities. Recommendations were developed around existing 
state statutes and department authorities in order to avoid legal and policy obstructions.  
6. Output 
This thesis reached conclusions regarding Florida’s agroterrorism preparedness 
and response capabilities and developed a series of recommendations for filling gaps in 
these capabilities. The thesis anticipated gaps would be found in Florida law 
enforcement’s preparedness and response capabilities. Research and analysis found 
response capabilities were already quite robust, requiring relatively minor policy changes 
to bridge the gaps and meet the NIJ report recommendations. Gaps in preparedness 
capabilities were more pronounced. Specifically, significant gaps in intelligence and 
information sharing were identified and found to impact all aspects of preparedness 
capabilities. Recommendations to bridge these gaps included creating a new agriculture 
focused Intelligence and Analysis section to enhance the State’s capability. These 
recommendations, pertaining to both preparedness and response, could all be 
prescriptively applied to fill these gaps and build a more robust defensive capability. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research contributes to the greater knowledge base on agroterrorism in 
general and specifically adds to the discourse concerning law enforcement’s role. At the 
state level this research provides a never-before completed policy review of Florida law 
enforcement’s role in agroterrorism defense and offer recommendations for enhancing 
this role and filling gaps in the defensive effort. Hopefully, real changes and 
 5 
enhancements can be accomplished, prescriptively applying some of the 
recommendations of the thesis. 
 
 6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review considers the topic of agroterrorism or the use of 
biological weapons against agriculture in support of a thesis addressing Florida law 
enforcement’s role addressing the threat of agroterrorism. This review draws from forty-
five sources to develop a survey of the academic findings on agroterrorism in the areas of 
the history of agro or bio terrorism, the modern day threat, naturally occurring outbreaks, 
risk, responsibilities, and current issues.  
The word Agroterrorism is coterminous with the larger study of Homeland 
Security, first beginning to appear in the literature around 2000. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) states agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism and adopts Jim 
Monke’s definition from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report 
Agroterrorism:  Threats and Preparedness, “the deliberate introduction of an animal or 
plant disease for the purpose of generating fear, causing economic losses, or undermining 
social stability.”4 Dr. Henry Parker in his McNair Paper, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A 
Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat defines this more narrowly as agricultural 
bioterrorism and then further differentiates between bioterror, biowar, and biocrime.5  
Bioterror is that perpetrated by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations; biowar 
would be recognized only during a formally declared war between states, and biocrime 
would be perpetrated by someone other than terrorists or states and for reasons other than 
religion or politics, i.e., this would generally be someone seeking financial gain. Parker 
notes that the consequences of any of these acts are likely to be the same, thus it is 
simpler to consider these subsets of bioterror and agroterror as the same types of acts of 
agroterrorism.6   
4. “Agroterrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed August 20, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/
publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/february-2012/agroterrorism. 
Jim Monke, Agroterrorism:  Threats and Preparedness (Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service, 
August 13, 2004). http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32521.pdf. 
5. Henry S. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat (Washington, D.C.: Institute 




                                                 
Agriculture and the agribusiness related industries represent 4.8% of the United 
States Gross Domestic Product and employed over 16 million Americans as of 2011.7  
During the same year total U.S. farm cash receipts reflected over $390 billion in sales for 
crops and livestock.8  Agricultural exports play a particularly important role in the U.S. 
economy with every $1 billion in exported product supporting 6,800 American jobs.9  
Export figures from 2012 reflected a banner year with $141 billion in U.S. agriculture 
exports.10  Across these fruited plains lie 2.1 million farms worth $1.43 trillion.11  These 
farms are holding approximately 89.3 million cattle, 67.5 million swine, and 5.5 million 
sheep as of 2013.12   
Despite agriculture’s importance and impact on U.S. prosperity many Americans 
give agriculture and the food supply little thought. United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Secretary Tom Vilsack said most Americans give little thought to 
how food gets to their tables, and “don’t quite get what’s going on on the farm.”13  
Perhaps this could be attributed to America’s easy access to abundant, cheap, quality 
food. Most Americans live within a few minutes’ drive to their choice of grocery stores 
full of fresh produce and meats. Along with this tremendous bounty on demand, 
Americans spend on average only 6.4% of their annual income on food, which is the 
lowest amount in the entire world.14 It is not uncommon to spend 40 percent to 50 
7. “USDA Economic Research Service - FAQs,” United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research 
Service, accessed September 4, 2013, http://www.ers.usda.gov/faqs.aspx#howimportant. 
8. Amy Klobuchar, The Economic Contribution of America’s Farmers and the Importance of Agricultural Exports 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Senate Joint Economic Committee, September 2013), 1, http://www.jec.senate.gov/
public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=266a0bf3-5142-4545-b806-ef9fd78b9c2f. 
9. Ibid., 2. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Terry Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from 
Agroterrorism (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, June 20, 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/212280.pdf. 
12. “Foot and Mouth Disease Fast Facts,” CNN, September 2, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/health/foot-
and-mouth-disease-fast-facts/index.html. 
13. Joe Itle, “Vilsack: Rural America Needs To Tell Its Story,” Farm Futures, November 7, 2013, 
http://farmfutures.com/story-vilsack-rural-america-needs-tell-0-104447. 
14. Billions Served, Washington State University, accessed August 17, 2014, http://wsm.wsu.edu/researcher/
WSMaug11_billions.pdf. 
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percent of annual income on food in other countries.15  Agriculture is a tremendous 
contributor to American prosperity and the American way of life. Unfortunately, this vital 
industry exists every day under the looming threat of terrorism. Indeed the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has defined agriculture as, “among the most vulnerable and 
least protected of all potential targets of attack.”16  
A. HISTORY OF AGRO AND BIO TERRORISM 
A history of the use of bioterrorism throughout the world is a common component 
of most agroterrorism research establishing that although it is uncommon and receives 
comparatively little attention, it has indeed been a tactic employed throughout history for 
millennia. Over two thousand years ago, the Romans contaminated their enemies’ water 
by dumping rotting corpses into their wells.17 During the French and Indian Wars the 
English gave smallpox infested blankets to Indians allied to the French, resulting in a 
devastating smallpox epidemic among the native population.18 Germany engaged in a 
large-scale bioweapons program during World War I involving the infection of military 
horses and livestock, including swabbing horses and mules with anthrax and glanders as 
they were shipped to the Allies.19 World War II saw further use of bioweapons against 
agriculture targets with Japan’s use of rinderpest and anthrax against Russia and 
Mongolia, as well as Germany’s alleged air dropping of beetles into English potato 
crops.20 The Soviets later experimented with ticks as a vector for transmitting foot-and-
mouth disease.21  Bioweapons research continued well into the Cold War with nine 
15. Ibid. 
16. “Agroterrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
17. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism. 
18. Ibid. 





20. Anne Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture (Belfar Center for Science and International Affairs, October 2000), 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/responding_to_the_threat_of_agroterrorism.pdf. 
21. Mark G. Polyak, “The Threat of Agroterrorism-Economics of Bioterrorism,” Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs 5 (2004): 31. 
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countries having agricultural bioweapons programs including Canada, France, Germany, 
Iraq, Japan, South Africa, UK, U.S., and USSR.22 
Dr. W. Seth Carus of the National Defense University Center for 
Counterproliferation Research published his seminal work Bioterrorism and Biocrimes in 
1998 chronicling in detail the history of the illicit use of biological agents around the 
world since 1900.23  Carus’ work has been referenced in the majority of academic papers 
on the topic of agroterrorism. In this paper Carus researched 270 alleged cases of the use 
of biological agents and documented 180 confirmed cases of illicit use of biological 
agents since 1990.24 Of the 180 most involved interests, threat, hoax, or the objective was 
not determined, however in twenty-three cases biological agents were acquired and/or 
used for criminal purposes and in eight cases biological agents were acquired and/or used 
by terrorists.25 Carus noted most of the criminal and terrorism related cases occurred 
after 1990 possibly indicating an increasing interest in bioterror tactics.  
Parker delved into a deeper analysis of Carus’ research. There were twenty-four 
confirmed cases of bioterrorism attacks during the one hundred year period averaging one 
attack every four years.26  Of these confirmed cases fourteen were agriculture related 
attacks of which eleven involved food poisoning and three involved plants or animals.27 
Most authors referencing Dr. Carus’ data tend to ignore most of his cases that involve 
only interest, threat, and hoax. Indeed many authors state that there have only been two 
actual cases of agroterrorism in recent history and cite the Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya 
killing cattle with plant toxins and the Rajneeshee cult infecting salad bars with 
salmonella in Oregon.28  However, this seems to be a somewhat narrow interpretation of 
22. Monke, Agroterrorism:  Threats and Preparedness, 5. 
23. W. Seth Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents since 1900” (Center for 




26. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, 19. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Peter Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly the Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks against 
the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry (Santa Monica, CA:  Rand Corporation, 2004), http://search.ebscohost.com/
login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=105332. 
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agroterror attacks and ignores many other actual incidents such as the Israeli settlers who 
destroyed 17,000 tons of Palestinian grapes with pesticide and the Arabs who poisoned 
Israeli oranges with mercury, just to cite two examples.29   
Another source commonly cited is the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The MIIS collaborated a great deal 
with Carus in his research. The MIIS has catalogued twenty-three occurrences of 
chemical or biological weapon incidents targeting agriculture between 1915 and 2008 of 
which nineteen are defined as acts of Agroterror.30  Also documented are twelve large-
scale cases of targeting the food supply including crops, large-scale being defined as 
more than thirty casualties and/or greater than $100 million in lost revenue.31 
B. THE MODERN THREAT 
The 2005 Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ) study 
Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture From 
Agroterrorism identified the categories posing the greatest potential to employ 
agroterrorism as international terrorists, domestic terrorists, animal rights extremists, and 
economic opportunists.32 While not falling under the classification of terrorist, 
disgruntled employees seeking revenge on an employer are also noted as posing a high 
potential to employ agroterror tactics. The FBI agrees with the NIJ assessment of 
agroterror threat sources even citing the NIJ report as their source.33  Ann Kohnen in her 
seminal work, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations 
for the United States Department of Agriculture describes, “a multidimensional threat, 
involving a wide range of motives and perpetrators, and encompassing a wide range of 
actions, from single acts of sabotage to strategic wartime programs.”34  While Kohnen 
29. Monke, Agroterrorism:  Threats and Preparedness, 5. 
30. “Agriculture | Chemical & Biological Weapons | James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS),” 
(Monterey Institute of International Studies), accessed August 14, 2013, http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/agchron.htm. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism.  
33. “Agroterrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
34. Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture. 
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includes nation-states in the threat, most of the literature agrees the threat of 
agroterrorism comes primarily from sub-state actors, international and domestic terrorists 
and lone wolf types.   
While the history of agro and bioterrorism reveals a myriad of methods, the 
modern day threat focuses on naturally occurring biological agents from the animal and 
plant world collected or replicated and used intentionally to cause an outbreak. The 
World Organisation for Animal Health (formerly known as the Office International des 
Epizooties) or OIE, an intergovernmental organization working on worldwide animal 
health issues, maintains a website offering a treasure trove of information on animal 
diseases.35  The OIE site and data are referenced in numerous agroterrorism papers. Of 
particular concern are the OIE List A diseases which affect cattle, swine, and poultry. 
There are fifteen List A diseases including foot-and-mouth Disease (FMD), Bovine 
Spongiform Encephelopathy (BSE or Mad Cow), Newcastle Disease, and ten more. All 
but one are viruses, most of which transmit via direct contact though some spread via the 
air and others are spread by vectors or other organisms capable of transmitting disease 
such as ticks and mosquitos.36 
The 2005 NIJ report states agriculture experts are unanimous that FMD is the 
most deadly and most likely biological agent in an agroterrorism scenario.37 A review of 
the literature supports the NIJ assertion with an apparent total agreement among authors 
that FMD represents the greatest and most likely threat. FMD is a highly contagious viral 
disease infecting cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, pigs, and sheep. While the United 
States has enjoyed FMD-free status since 1929, the disease is endemic in South America, 
Africa, and Asia and exists in over one hundred countries around the world. The global 
cost around the world due to FMD varies from $6.5 to $21 billion per year depending on 
outbreaks and production losses.38  FMD has an incubation period of one to twenty-one 
35. “Home: OIE - World Organisation for Animal Health,” World Organisation for Animal Health, accessed 
August 14, 2013, http://www.oie.int/. 
36. Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture. 
37. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism. 
38. “FootandMouthDiseaseInfo.Org,” accessed May 14, 2014, http://www.fmdinfo.org/. 
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days, but generally three to eight days in most cases. The infected animal can excrete the 
virus for one to ten days before symptoms ever appear. Massive amounts of the virus are 
excreted and the virus is highly resilient. FMD spreads rapidly via infected animals, 
wind, milk, meat, animal products, feed, clothing, and equipment.39 
FMD is easily transmissible and spreads rapidly in the air. In the 1981 outbreak of 
FMD in France, the disease travelled and infected animals 175 miles away across the 
English Channel in three days. The 1997 FMD outbreak in Taiwan destroyed the nation’s 
swine industry with losses of $15 billion over three years of trade embargoes.40  Fifty 
thousand workers lost their jobs in the first week of the outbreak. Outbreaks in the United 
Kingdom include 2001, which resulted in destroying 6.2 million animals and economic 
losses of $20 billion, and another smaller outbreak in 2007.41  China and India have been 
referred to as “rogue nations” by one news article due to having many FMD outbreaks 
and covering them up rather than participate in worldwide reporting and control 
standards.42  
There are several FMD exercise and training scenarios available that illustrate the 
ease in which a terrorist could intentionally infect and spread FMD to livestock in an 
agroterror attack. While the U.S. is currently free of this disease, FMD remains endemic 
in Africa, Asia, and South America. The disease can be spread as easily as taking a 
mucus sample from an infected animal, soaking a handkerchief with the mucus, and then 
either wiping on another animal or just tossing it on the ground in a feedlot. The FBI 
discusses FMD on their webpage devoted to agroterrorism.43  The FBI notes that FMD is 
twenty times more contagious than smallpox, is extremely stable, can be spread from 
animal to animal by air from fifty miles away, and could spread to twenty-five states in 
39. Mohamed Abd El Rahman El Bably, Risk Analysis of Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak in Egypt
(Washington, DC:  United States Department of Agriculture.A griculture Research Service.), accessed May 14, 2014, 
http://www.ars.usda.gov/GFRA/presentations/Session7/
7.2%20EL%20Bably%20resentation%28%20Finallll%29%29.pdf. 
40. Mark G. Polyak, “The Threat of Agroterrorism-Economics of Bioterrorism.”
41. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism.
42. Menaka Sanjay Gandhi, “China, India Rogue Nations,” Pravasi Mathrubhumi, December 4, 2013, sec.
Science, http://www.mathrubhumi.com/english/columns/china-india-rogue-nations-142035.html. 
43. “Agroterrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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five days. Humans carry the virus in their lungs and can then transmit it to animals they 
come into contact with for forty-eight hours. According to the FBI foot and mouth 
disease is an “ominous threat” to the United States.44 
Bill White, Director of the Plum Island Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic 
Laboratory, speaking to the Missouri Livestock Symposium stated, “Foot-and-mouth 
disease is the most-important disease to worry about here in the United States,” and noted 
FMD can spread across forty states within two weeks.45  The potential economic damage 
resulting from an FMD outbreak is almost unthinkable. One economist estimates a loss of 
$750,000 to $1 million per operating hour that the U.S. beef industry is halted due to a 
nationwide FMD outbreak; with total estimated losses of up to $60 billion by the time the 
outbreak is squashed.46 The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
publication “Overview of FMD Vaccine Issues” notes the total economic impact of an 
outbreak over the long term is estimated at $12.8 billion per year for ten years with a total 
price tag of $128 billion.47 
 An agroterror attack against crops is generally considered less likely than one 
targeting animals for reasons having to do with characteristics of plant specific biological 
agents. Plant pathogens are highly sensitive to temperature, humidity, and sunlight, they 
do not travel far or fast through the air, and they would be more difficult for a potential 
terrorist to produce and effectively disperse.48 However, crop attacks have indeed 
occurred throughout history and could be attempted again. Kohnen’s paper is one of the 
few papers to dedicate a significant portion to crop diseases and use of bioweapons to 
attack crops.49  A few authors gloss over the crop aspect, but most do not address the 
44. Ibid.
45. Mindy Ward, “FMD Greatest Threat to Livestock Industry,” Missouri Farmer Today, December 16, 2010,
http://www.missourifarmertoday.com/news/fmd-greatest-threat-to-livestock-industry/article_b3ba75ef-7944-50aa-
afb7-b1ff2ad27661.html. 
46. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism.
47. United States Department of Agriculture, Foot - and - Mouth Disease (FMD) Response Ready Reference
Guide — Overview of FMD Vaccine Issues (Washington, DC, August 2013), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/fmd_plan_rrg_vaccine.pdf. 
48. Kohnen, Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States
Department of Agriculture. 
49. Ibid.
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topic at all, instead focusing on animal pathogens and specifically on FMD. Kohnen 
discusses Iraq’s bioweapons program of the 1980s and 90s at which time they were 
developing fungi diseases, including rusts, blasts, and smuts, which would affect cereal 
crops such as wheat.50  
C. NATURALLY OCCURRING OUTBREAKS AND DISASTERS 
The nature of agricultural disasters, whether naturally occurring or intentional, 
makes the threat dynamic different from any other potential target or potential terror 
tactic.  This thesis focuses on the intentional, manmade act of agroterrorism and does not 
delve into naturally occurring agriculture disasters. However, agricultural bio-disasters 
would behave the same way, whether natural or intentional, because the biological agents 
causing the outbreak are themselves the same. Cain points out that there is no data to 
prove that natural outbreaks vs. terrorism would be comparable, however, he asserts if 
anything the agroterrorism event would be worse.51 Homeland Security Director of Food, 
Agriculture, and Water Security Floyd Horn noted, “Naturally occurring outbreaks of 
diseases signal the devastation that could result from a carefully choreographed 
intentional release…. recent epidemics aptly demonstrate the vulnerability of living 
targets to biological pathogens and the economic chaos that can result from an 
outbreak—intentional or otherwise.”52  There are no naturally occurring bombings or 
aircraft hijackings, thus the only data available to study on most any other aspect of 
terrorism comes from actual terrorism events. On the other hand, agriculture bio-events 
occur all the time. Naturally occurring diseases cost U.S. agriculture producers about 
$17.5 billion for livestock disease and $30 billion for crop disease every year.53 
Mass sickening, deaths, and economic damage from contaminations in the food 
supply chain occur with some frequency. In 1989 Mexican cantaloupes infected with 
50. Ibid., 8. 
51. Cain, “Agroterrorism,” 1. 
52. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, vi. 
53. R.M. Goodrich et al., “Agroterrorism in the U.S.:  An Overview” (University of Florida IFAS, October  
2005), 1. 
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salmonella sickened 25,000 in the U.S.54 Fourteen hundred Americans were sickened 
with salmonella in April 2008 by what was first blamed on Florida tomatoes and was 
later traced back to Mexican peppers.55  The infamous peanut butter salmonella outbreak 
in 2008 and 2009 was one of largest outbreaks in history, with hundreds becoming sick 
all around the U.S. and nine deaths resulting.56  Indeed there is nothing exotic about food 
poisoning. Taken from their website cdc.gov the Centers for Disease Control, “estimates 
that each year roughly one in six Americans (or 48 million people) get sick, 128,000 are 
hospitalized, and 3,000 die of foodborne diseases.”57 
Biological disease outbreaks in crops are not uncommon. In 1970 an outbreak of 
Leaf Blight in U.S. corn caused $1 billion in damage.58 In 1990 Karnal Blunt was found 
in U.S. wheat stopping exports. Damage caused by these outbreaks today could top $100 
billion.59  USDA estimates peg damages at $1.5 billion per year if the Mediterranean 
fruit fly (Medfly) became established in the U.S.60 Florida has experienced periodic 
Medfly outbreaks since the 1920s the most recent in 1998 and again in 2010.61  Florida 
battled citrus canker for decades with costs totaling nearly $1 billion before determining 
it could not be eradicated. Interestingly, MIIS notes that in 1996 a claim was made 
speculating that recent citrus canker outbreaks were intentionally introduced by Cuba.62 
54. Regina Birner et al., “Security Analysis for Agroterrorism: Applying the Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence 
Framework to Developing Countries,” (International Food Policy Research Institute, accessed August 21, 2013). 
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/security-analysis-agroterrorism?print. 
55. Stephen Thompson, Tomato Growers Take Big Hit In Food Scare (Washington, DC:  United States 
Department of Agriculture. Rural Development), accessed August 14, 2013, http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/
sep08/feeling.htm. 
56. Brent Kendall and Devlin Barrett, “Four Accused of Salmonella Coverup,” The Wall Street Journal, February 
21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324503204578318024027438166. 
57. “CDC - Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States,” Centers for Disease Control, accessed November 
24, 2013, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/. 
58. Cain, “Agroterrorism.” 
59. Ibid. 
60. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture,” 20. 
61. J. B. Heppner and M. C. Thomas, “Mediterranean Fruit Fly, Ceratitis Capitata (Wiedemann) (Insecta: Diptera: 
Tephritidae),” University of Florida IFAS, June 26, 2013, http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/in371. 
62. “Agriculture | Chemical & Biological Weapons | James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS),” 
Monterrey Institute for International Studies.  
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Animal disease outbreaks can be some of the most economically devastating of all 
agriculture disasters. In 2003 a single cow in Washington State was found infected with 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also called “mad cow.” When the U.S. 
announced the discovery, thirty major importers, including Canada, Mexico, Japan, and 
Korea, immediately suspended shipments. Total estimated losses for beef exports to those 
countries in 2004 were estimated at $3.2 billion to $4.7 billion.63  Several FMD 
outbreaks around the world including, Taiwan and the United Kingdom have already 
been discussed.   
The U.S. has been FMD free since 1929, but the potential threat of the disease has 
prompted continued research and preparation for the possibility of an outbreak. The map 
in Figure 1 depicts a Multiscale Epidemiological/Economic Simulation and Analysis 
conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to model how a single 
infection of FMD in the Midwest, whether naturally occurring or intentional, could 
spread over a period of fifty days (as taken from Science and Technology Review).64   
 
 
Figure 1. FMD Outbreak Model65 
63. Charles E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2006), 6, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA460674. 
64. Gabriele Rennie, “Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism,” Science and Technology Review, accessed 
August 17, 2014, https://www.llnl.gov/str/Sep07/Bates.html. 
65. Ibid. 
 17 
                                                 
An outbreak such as the one depicted on this model would cost untold billions, if not 
hundreds of billions, in direct eradication costs as well as indirect economic losses. 
United States cash receipts for livestock and related products alone account for over $170 
billion per year.66 
D. RISK = THREAT X VULNERABILITY X  CONSEQUENCE 
Discussion of risk is a common component in agroterrorism papers, probably 
because of the rarity of this type of attack and the need to establish the gravity of the 
threat. In fact, agroterrorism is often referred to in the literature as “low probability – 
high consequence”67 due to the nature of being a rare event yet when and if it does occur 
there are dire consequences. However, as former Secretary of Health and Human 
Services Tommy Thompson said, “I for the life of me cannot understand why the 
terrorists have not, you know, attacked our food supply, because it’s so easy to do.”68  
Similarly, U.S. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) noted, “In the war on terrorism, the fields 
and pastures of America’s farmland might seem at first to have nothing in common with 
the towers of the World Trade Center or busy seaports. In fact, however, they are merely 
different manifestations of the same high priority target, the American economy.”69 
Not everyone writing on agroterrorism agrees with these threat assessments. 
Professor of Food Science at the University of Tennessee Dr. Jean Wesse downplayed the 
possibility of an agroterrorism attack saying the food chain is vulnerable but lacks appeal 
to terrorists.70  Doug Archer with the University of Florida Institute of Food and 
Agricultural Sciences says agroterrorism is not something the public should worry about, 
as it is very difficult to introduce harmful substances into the food supply.71  When asked 
66. Klobuchar, The Economic Contribution of America’s Farmers and the Importance of Agricultural Exports, 2. 
67. Birner, “Security Analysis for Agroterrorism,” 13 
68. Richard Byrne, “Agroterrorism and Biosecurity, Threat, Response, and Industry Communication” (Scholarship 
Paper, Harper Adams University College, 2007), 5. http://www.nuffieldinternational.org/rep_pdf/
12565895572007_Richard_Byrne_Nuffield_Report.pdf. 
69. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism, 95. 
70. Barry Neild, “CNN.com - Agroterrorism: How Real Is the Threat? - Sep 25, 2006,” CNN.com (September 25, 
2006), zotero://attachment/394/. 
71. “Agro-Terrorism: From the Farm to the Fork,” WCJB-TV 20 ABC News (February 19, 2013), 
zotero://attachment/444/. 
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about agroterrorism for a news interview, FBI Agent John Frank of the Mobile, AL field 
office stated the, “food sector not likely target for terrorists.”72 
The risk to human life in Agroterrorism comes primarily from food chain 
contaminations and some risk from animal disease outbreaks. Zoonotic diseases are those 
animal diseases that are transmissible and harmful to humans. During an outbreak of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza in Hong Kong in 1997 six people died.73  Infectious 
diseases are now the third leading cause of death in the U.S. and 75 percent of emerging 
human pathogens are zoonotic,74 raising serious concerns during outbreaks such as Nipah 
virus in Malaysia and West Nile in New York. In his Rand report Hitting America’s Soft 
Underbelly, Peter Chalk notes, “The food chain offers a low-tech mechanism that is 
nevertheless conducive to disseminating toxins and bacteria.”75  The increased number of 
entry points into the food supply chain, along with the general lack of security and 
surveillance at processing plants, lead to the ease with which an attack on the food supply 
could be launched.   
The greatest risk resulting from an agroterrorism attack is the economic damage. 
Parker notes, “even the threat of attack could jeopardize consumer confidence, disrupt 
commodity markets, and wreak economic havoc.”76  Kohnen points out that crop 
diseases do not pose a threat to human life, but as documented previously pose enormous 
economic liability due to failed harvests.77  In Florida crops are enormously important to 
the state economy as evidenced by facts and figures taken from the Florida Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services (FDACS) 2012 Florida Agricultural Statistical 
72. Robert Lee, “Agroterrorism a Concern but Not Reason to Panic,” The Plainsman, accessed August 14, 2013, 
http://www.theplainsman.com/view/full_story/18205479/article-Agroterrorism-a-concern--but-not-reason-to-
panic?instance=home_news_lead_story. 
73. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture,” 20. 
74. James Jay Carafano, “Improving Federal Response to Catastrophic Bioterrorist Attacks: The Next Steps,” The 
Heritage Foundation, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/11/improving-federal-
response-to-catastrophic-bioterrorist-attacks-the-next-steps. 
75. Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly the Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks against the 
U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry, x. 
76. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, Introduction. 
77. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture,” 17. 
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Directory.78 Florida’s farm industry alone includes 47,500 farms, spread across 9 million 
acres, growing 300 different crops.79 Florida expends considerable effort on preventing 
the introduction of plant pests and diseases, as the state has experienced its share of crop 
disasters over the years including citrus canker, citrus greening, and Medfly outbreaks, 
among others.  
E. RESPONSIBILITIES 
America’s defensive posture towards the threat of agroterrorism has evolved and 
strengthened since the attacks of September 11. The year 2002 brought the Homeland 
Security Act creating the Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border 
Protection bringing enhancements to agricultural border inspections. The same year the 
Public Health Safety Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act strengthened control 
over biological agents and addressed safety and security in the food supply chain.80  Food 
and agriculture were recognized and added to the nations’ critical infrastructure roll in 
2003 by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7).81  The following year 
HSPD-9 (Defending Food and Agriculture) required DHS, USDA, HHS, EPA, AG and 
CIA to coordinate in preparing, protecting, and responding to the threat of 
agroterrorism.82  The 2007 Agriculture and Food Protection Sector Specific Plan annex 
to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan is the USDA and sector partners plan for 
prioritizing infrastructure in the agriculture sector and applying a risk assessment 
methodology (CARVER + Shock) to determine the criticality of assets, systems, 
networks, and functions in food and agriculture.83 
78. “Overview of Florida Agriculture - Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,” Florida 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, accessed August 19, 2013, http://www.florida-agriculture.com/
consumers/crops/agoverview/. 
79. Ibid., 2. 
80. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, PL107–188, accessed 
August 21, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ188/html/PLAW-107publ188.htm. 
81. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7:  Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection (United States, Office of the Federal Register, December 17, 2003), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/
index.html. 
82. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9:  Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (United States, 
Office of the Federal Register, January 20, 2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html. 
83. United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture and Food:  Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington, DC, May 2007). 
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Federal responsibilities for the protection of the food and agriculture sectors are 
divided between the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the 
Department of Health. The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
have primary federal prevention and response responsibility for all aspects of animal and 
plant disasters or outbreaks.84 Under APHIS the Veterinary Services division is 
responsible for animals and the farming industry, while the Plant Protection and 
Quarantine (PPQ) division works to protect crops and plants from the spread of pests and 
diseases, especially those of international origin.85 USDA PPQ had significant presence 
at U.S. border points enforcing plant protection regulations until 2003 with the creation 
of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and their assumption of these enforcement 
duties.86  CBP is now America’s first line of defense in preventing international based 
agroterrorism and naturally occurring diseases from entering the US. Federal 
responsibility for the food supply is shared between the USDA Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS), which regulates meat and poultry, and the Food and Drug 
Administration of the Department of Health, which oversees all other food products.87 
State responsibilities will vary depending on the state, however the typical state 
model bears significant similarities to the federal roles. In Florida, animal and plant 
agriculture protection is relegated by statute to FDACS by Chapter 570 of the Florida 
State Statutes.88 Food regulation is split between FDACS, Florida Department of 
Business and Professional Regulation, and the Florida Department of Health. FDACS is 
one of the only of its kind to have a law enforcement division, the Office of Agricultural 
Law Enforcement, whose mission is to protect Florida’s agriculture and its consumers 
through professional law enforcement.89   
84. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Agrodefense,” Frontline:  Customs and Border Protection 2, no. 1 
(Fall/Winter 2008). 
87. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism. 
88. “Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,” F.S.S. Ch. 570 (2013), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/
statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0500-0599/0570/0570.html. 
89. Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, Written Directives. 
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Response to an agroterrorism event would involve federal, state, and local 
functions. From the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would come Disaster 
Medical Assistance Teams and Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, as well as all the 
resources of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has federal 
responsibility for coordinating response to any terror attack or major disaster.90  DHS 
also owns the Plum Island Animal Disease Center where any pathogens would go for 
testing. USDA APHIS and FSIS also have their own procedures and specialty teams for 
investigating and responding to these events. The USDA has an extensive FMD control 
strategy written into a 241 page document entitled the “Foot-And-Mouth Disease 
Response Plan” or The Red Book.91  This comprehensive strategy covers all aspects of 
preparing for, responding to, and eradicating FMD including a pre-outbreak strategy, 
movement control and zoning in the event of an outbreak, traceability, and a vaccination 
policy.   
A law enforcement response to an agroterrorism event would involve partnerships 
with several entities. The FBI has mandated federal lead role responsibility for all 
domestic terrorism events as per the 1995 Presidential Decision Directive (PPD) 39 U.S. 
Policy on Counterterrorism.92 The USDA Office of Inspector General and FDA Office 
of Criminal Investigations are also federal law enforcement entities with responsibilities 
for investigating threatened or actual criminal acts against food and agriculture.93   
The literature seems to be in general agreement that the most important segment 
of responsibility lies in the private domain with the agribusiness sector. Parker notes, “the 
private sector will ultimately be responsible for developing and implementing biosecurity 
measures to protect farms and agribusiness interests from acts of terrorism or to 
remediate the effects of terrorism if it should occur.”94 Many of Kohnen’s 
90. Carafano, “Improving Federal Response to Catastrophic Bioterrorist Attacks.” 
91. United States Department of Agriculture, Foot - and Mouth Disease Response Plan.T he Red Book 
(Washington, DC, November 2010), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/acah/downloads/documents/
FMD_Response_Plan_November_2010_FINAL.pdf. 
92. Presidential Policy Directive 39. U.S. Policy On Counterterrorism.W ashington, DC (1995). 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462942. 
93. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism, 42. 
94. Ibid., 44. 
 22 
                                                 
recommendations revolve around the need for USDA to engage with farmers and 
industry stakeholders to improve education and biosecurity standards.95  Chalk echoes 
with similar findings.96  In her thesis, Perceptions of Florida Beef Cattle Producers on 
Preparedness for an Agroterror Attack, Jodi Degraw addresses the great role animal 
industry stakeholders play in agroterrorism defense and researched their knowledge on 
the issue and any steps taken in biosecurity.97 Degraw concluded that increased 
biosecurity safety practices were needed, as well as increased information and 
educational outreach.98 
F. ISSUES IN AGROTERRORISM 
Most every author researching and writing about agroterrorism picks some aspect 
on the topic to research, analyze, and formulate recommendations in hopes of improving 
the homeland security defensive network and add to the knowledge base. Kohnen wrote 
urging USDA to increase animal disease vaccination supplies, provide the farmers with 
biosecurity training, and enhance and increase its disease detection and surveillance 
capabilities.99  Chalk makes recommendations for needs analysis, increasing the number 
of Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) trained veterinarians, law enforcement and intelligence 
issues, and disease reporting and surveillance enhancements.100 Parker made many of the 
same recommendations as Kohnen and also emphasized cross agency collaboration. 
Parker, borrowing from Kohnen and Chalk, reinforces many of their recommendations 
and stresses the need for a threat and risk assessment for agricultural bioterrorism to 
facilitate a properly focused national strategy.101  Mark Polyak in his paper The Threat of 
95. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture.” 
96. Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly the Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks against the 
U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry. 
97. Jodi Lynn DeGraw, “Perceptions of Florida Beef Cattle Producers on Preparedness for An Agroterrorism 
Attack” (Masters thesis, University of Florida, 2005), http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0011863/degraw_j.pdf. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture.” 
100. Chalk, Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly the Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks against the 
U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry. 
101. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism. 
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Agroterrorism:  Economics of Bioterrorism comes to similar conclusions focusing most 
of his recommendations on animal disease research, surveillance, detection, modeling, 
and funding.    
James Carafano writing for the Heritage Foundation describes the current federal 
approach to a biotoxin attack as “totally inadequate” and outlines his plan for developing 
a national response system of reduced bottlenecks, increased surge capacity, and the 
capability of quickly moving assistance into local communities.102 One of his 
recommendations was the creation of a DHS Assistant Secretary for Bioterrorism and 
Infectious Disease Response.103  In her Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security thesis Ellen Gordon issued a, “call to action for state government 
officials to demonstrate leadership by aggressively pursuing the development of interstate 
collaboration for homeland security, in agro-terrorism and beyond” and made the case for 
multi-state compacts focusing on food security.104 
Interestingly, very little is written in the literature regarding law enforcement’s 
role in agroterrorism. Among his recommendations, Chalk urges a focus of attention on 
law enforcement and forensic investigations for determining whether disease outbreaks 
are deliberate or naturally occurring.105  This is an acknowledgement of the similarity 
between naturally occurring agricultural disease outbreaks versus an intentional event. 
Without a law enforcement investigation to determine otherwise, and if no one takes 
credit for an event, the assumption is automatic that it was naturally occurring. Monke 
makes a small reference to building a climate of information sharing between law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies that collect information and USDA, DHS, and 
others in the intelligence community to ensure agriculture is given its proper focus.106  
102. Carafano, “Improving Federal Response to Catastrophic Bioterrorist Attacks.” 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ellen Gordon, “MULTI-STATE INITIATIVES---AGRICULTURE SECURITY PREPAREDNESS” 
(Masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). 
105. Peter Chalk, Agroterrorism: What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It? (Santa Monica, CA, Rand 
Corporation, 2004.), accessed August 20, 2013, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7565/index1.html. 
106. Monke, Agroterrorism:  Threats and Preparedness. 
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The only other known reference in agroterrorism research regarding law enforcement’s 
role is the 2005 NIJ report, which is the seminal work on this topic in the literature. 
In 2003 the Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice commissioned a 
panel of experts and stakeholders from law enforcement, agriculture, animal health, and 
academia to conduct a twenty-one month study with the objective as stated in the title of 
the 2005 report: Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture 
from Agroterrorism. The NIJ commission established baseline data by surveying Kansas 
sheriffs and livestock industry stakeholders about agro and bio terrorism and studying the 
complexities of agro-movement. Recommendations were made for sweeping policy 
changes and new collaborative programs, which were enacted in Kansas. These included 
law enforcement intelligence networks which included specific focus areas on 
agriculture, agriculture event response teams comprised of animal health experts and 
criminal investigators, forensic evidence procedures for animal events, interaction with 
the community and industry through the Agroguard program, collaboration with USDA 
via their Smuggled Food Interdiction Teams, and new agroterrorism training initiatives 













107. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism. 
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III. THE NIJ REPORT 
In 2003 the United States Department of Justice National Institutes of Justice 
(NIJ) sponsored a twenty-one month study into law enforcement’s role in defending 
against the threat of agroterrorism.108 A team of experts was brought together to 
spearhead and author this study with a goal from the outset of stressing the need for a 
strong partnership between the law enforcement and livestock fields. These experts were 
assembled from professions as varied as law enforcement, agriculture, animal health, 
academic research, and criminal justice education.   
A. OVERVIEW 
The experts who would go on to author this NIJ study included:  Terry Knowles, 
Deputy Director, Kansas Bureau of Investigation; James Lane, Undersheriff, Ford 
County Sheriff’s Office; Dr. Gary Bayens, Chair, Criminal Justice Department, 
Washburn University; Dr. Nevil Speer, Associate Professor, Department of Agriculture, 
Western Kentucky University; Dr. Jerry Jaax, Research Provost, College of Veterinary 
Medicine, Kansas State University; Dr. David Carter, Professor, School of Criminal 
Justice, Michigan State University; Dr. Andra Bannister, Director, Regional Community 
Policing Training Institute, Wichita State University; and with Dr. Sandra L Woerle, 
assigned by the NIJ as the study Research Project Manager.109 
The final 188-page report was finished on June 20, 2005, delivered to the NIJ in 
December, 2005, identified as NIJ document number 212280, and titled Defining Law 
Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism. 
(NIJ212280).110 NIJ212280 was conducted with the purpose, as stated in the Research 
Project:  Goals and Objectives section, of accomplishing the following objectives: 
 
 




                                                 
1. Identify bioterrorism vulnerabilities of America’s livestock industry. 
2. Identify proactive measures by law enforcement needed to help protect the 
nation’s livestock industry from Agroterrorism. 
3. Identify the emergency response procedures and resources required by law 
enforcement to respond to an act of Agroterrorism. 
4. Develop a standardized training module for law enforcement agencies 
interested in addressing Agroterrorism.111 
Research methodology used included focus group sessions, field surveys and 
interviews, two full-scale exercises, and analysis of the results from programs enacted in 
Kansas on a trial basis for the purposes of this study.112 
B. RESEARCH 
Focus groups were used to solicit input from industry members and stakeholders 
including law enforcement, government officials, livestock producers and ranchers, meat 
packers and processors, transportation industry, feedlot managers, and animal health 
professionals.113 The group discussed agroterrorism vulnerabilities, prevention strategies, 
response issues, and training. The focus group discussions were wide-ranging and open-
ended, collecting that first mass of data for the study and providing direction in crafting 
the surveys.   
Surveys were sent to each of the 105 sheriffs in the State of Kansas with an 81 
percent return rate.114 The twenty-five question Likert-scale surveys requested basic 
agency demographic information and then twenty-two questions relating to the agency’s 
posture towards agroterrorism. Most of the sheriffs departments were not familiar with 
the state’s FAD response plan, most did not have a plan for instituting quarantines or 
movement controls, most did not have a policy for responding to a biological or weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) event, and only about half had received any WMD response 
training.115   
111. Ibid., 25. 
112. Ibid. 
113. Ibid., iv. 
114. Ibid., 54. 
115. Ibid., 58–69. 
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Surveys were also sent to members of livestock associations in Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and Texas. Of the 400 fifteen-question surveys mailed 129, or 33 percent, 
were returned.116 The majority of the respondents were not concerned with vulnerability 
or security at their site or facility and were not engaged in agroterrorism prevention or 
training.117 The focus group session results and the survey questionnaires results fed into 
the exercise development, programs and initiatives enacted, and the study conclusions 
reached by the authors. 
From the focus group session, the authors identified a list of law enforcement’s 
duties and responsibilities in the event of an agroterrorism initiated foreign animal 
disease event and itemized them under the two categories of prevention and emergency 
response. Figure 2 summarizes these responsibilities. 
 
Prevention:  
   • Identify threats to the local agricultural industry;  
   • Conduct vulnerability assessment of potential local agricultural targets;  
   • Develop new partnerships with health officials and industry personnel;  
   • Establish an awareness and criminal intelligence database;  
   • Develop a community policing strategy for the local livestock industry.  
 
Emergency Response:  
   • Implement local response plan (National Incident Management System 
   {NIMS});  
   • Crime scene management:  
     o  tissue collection from infected animals;  
     o  evidence collection from the affected premise; and  
     o  suspect development.  
   • Enforce the quarantine plan ordered by the Livestock Commissioner;  
   • Enforce the stop movement order by restricting movement of all related 
   livestock vehicles;  
   • Conduct a full-scale criminal investigation to identify/apprehend/prosecute 
   suspects;  
   • Conflict resolution, e.g., civil unrest, breakdown of basic services,  
   emotional stress, and impact of public health issues. 
Figure 2. NIJ Report Law Enforcement Responsibilities118 
116. Ibid., 73. 
117. Ibid., 73–82. 
118. Ibid., 3. 
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Identifying these duties and responsibilities was key to developing effective 
exercises for further data collection, as well as aiding in the identification of existing 
gaps, ultimately leading to the programs and initiatives later developed.  
1. Simulation Exercises 
Two full-scale simulation exercises, Sudden Impact and Endangered Species, 
were developed and conducted for NIJ212280. The exercises were crafted with an eye to 
law enforcement’s two primary categories of duties and responsibilities in agroterrorism: 
response and prevention. Sudden Impact was designed to test the Kansas foreign animal 
disease (FAD) response plan; specifically seeking to identify issues arising from a FAD 
outbreak including quarantine effectiveness, inter-agency issues, and interactions 
between the EOC and response agencies.119 The scenario involved an act of 
agroterrorism via intentional introduction of Vesicular Stomatitus (VSv). Findings and 
recommendations from Sudden Impact that directly contributed to NIJ212280 included 
recommending establishing a criminal intelligence database specifically focused on 
agroterrorism threats and establishing Regional Response Teams comprised of both 
animal health professionals and criminal investigators for responding to FAD 
outbreaks.120 
Endangered Species, building on the findings from Sudden Impact, tested law 
enforcement’s agroterrorism prevention capabilities. This exercise focused primarily on 
intelligence capabilities for identifying and acting on a threat to agriculture, measuring 
this response, and identifying any intelligence related deficiencies. The scenario 
generated suspicious activity reports linked to a suspect intending to perpetrate an 
agroterrorism FAD attack at the state fair. Key findings and recommendations resulting 
from Endangered Species that directly contributed to NIJ212280 included recommending 
improving communication and information sharing between the agriculture community 
and law enforcement, clarifying law enforcement’s role in preventing agroterrorism, and 
119. Ibid., 84. 
120. Ibid., 86. 
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increasing law enforcement’s agroterrorism intelligence activities including use of 
intelligence databases and development of intelligence sources.121   
C. PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 
In the course of that study the authors implemented several new programs and 
initiatives in the State of Kansas based on the findings and recommendations resulting 
from their research and designed to enhance agroterrorism defense. These included the 
Regional Response Teams (RRT), the Agro-Guard Community Policing program, 
Smuggled-Food Interdiction Teams (SFIT) program, and initiatives for agroterrorism 
training for law enforcement and the agriculture industry.122 
1. Training 
 At the time of the study, there was a dearth of existing agroterrorism training 
available to law enforcement, so the authors resolved to design their own. Training needs 
were identified as needing to be targeted to audience. For law enforcement, patrol 
officers needed a more general level of agroterrorism awareness and vigilance-focused 
training, while investigators needed more detailed training on indicators of agroterrorism. 
The agriculture community needed general awareness training, as well as information on 
prevention.123 
  The training module outline was included in the NIJ21228 Appendix and 
included sections on agriculture industry overview, vulnerabilities and threats, WMD 
agents, planning and prevention.124  Subsections specific to law enforcement’s duties and 
responsibilities in an agroterrorism event included response related topics on the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS), evidence, 
crime scenes, and quarantines, as well as prevention-related topics including 
agroterrorism indicators, intelligence, and Agro-Guard. 
121. Ibid., 86–88. 
122. Ibid., 131–150. 
123. Ibid., 142–150. 
124. Ibid., 186–187. 
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2. Regional Response Teams 
The authors of NIJ212280 identified two basic questions to be answered in the 
handling of an animal related agroterrorism event. Would veterinarians be capable of 
meeting evidentiary standards in their handling of the various samples and materials 
encountered in their response to the event, and would law enforcement officers be 
capable of adapting their duties and responsibilities in the midst of the disease outbreak?  
These questions were addressed with the RRT concept. In the State of Kansas, seven 
regional teams were designated around the state, each one including a government field 
veterinarian and a certified law enforcement investigator from either the state 
investigative bureau or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).   
The purpose of the RRT was to enable FAD event response efforts to 
simultaneously focus on both the disease outbreak issues, as well as evidentiary and 
crime-scene issues. The authors noted merely forming these teams was not enough, 
stating, “the key to making the response successful is full integration of the teams, a task 
that can be accomplished through training, field exercises, and other events designed to 
bring about a common awareness of and appreciation for each team’s discipline and 
expertise.”125 Joint training sessions were conducted and procedures established for the 
RRTs. 
3. Smuggled Food Interdiction Team 
Another cooperative program highlighted in NIJ212280 was the Smuggled Food 
Interdiction Team (SIFT).126  The purpose of the SIFT is to interdict smuggled and/or 
illegal food products that may contain harmful diseases or pests. For one example, illegal 
processed meats from Mexico may contain FMD or classical swine fever (CSF) virus, 
which could be transmitted inadvertently or intentionally to livestock and result in an 
outbreak. The Safeguarding, Intervention, and Trade Compliance (SITC) team is a 
nationwide USDA program tasked with interdicting these products.   
 
125. Ibid., 131. 
126. Ibid., 140–142. 
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4. Agro-Guard Community Policing Program 
The Agro-Guard Community Policing Program was developed by the authors of 
NIJ212280 to function as a neighborhood watch for agriculture with a focus on 
prevention and information sharing, while serving as a conduit linking law enforcement 
with the agriculture community.127 The Agro-Guard concept focused heavily on 
prevention and included an education and outreach program to the livestock industry and 
law enforcement’s interaction with the industry in exchanging information and 
intelligence gathering. Law enforcement engaged with industry stakeholders, including 
producers, feeders, packers, animal health professionals, etc., in an education campaign 
to inform them on the threat to agriculture and in reporting suspicious activity. Agro-
Guard Community Policing Program signs, as seen in Figure 3, were placed throughout 









Figure 3. Agro-Guard Sign128 
127. Ibid., 133–140. 
128. Ibid., 133. 
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The study stresses law enforcement’s duty in taking suspicious activity reports 
from the agriculture industry seriously and following up quickly and thoroughly. Law 
enforcement must forward information to state threat centers, law enforcement 
intelligence networks, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), or any other applicable 
entity. Sharing information back with the agriculture industry was emphasized as well.  
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
NIJ212280 reached a series of conclusions, which were unanimously agreed upon 
by the authors. The authors concluded, of all the agroterror attack vectors considered, 
FMD posed the greatest threat in terms of impacts on the agriculture industry, the public, 
and the economy both, in the short term and in regards to long-term recovery. The study 
concluded a partnership between law enforcement and the agriculture industry was 
needed to maintain an effective agriculture defense and collaborate on early warning 
signs, proactive measures, and an information network. Despite law enforcement’s 
important role in protecting agriculture, the vast research conducted for the study’s 
extensive literature review uncovered nearly no writings on this topic. Development of 
information and intelligence becomes an important theme in the study, as the authors 
conclude the development and sharing of agriculture related intelligence is practically 
non-existent. Conclusions were also reached that law enforcement overall has done little 
to prepare and plan for meeting an agroterrorism threat or foreign animal disease 
outbreak, and that in the event of such a disaster, law enforcement resources would be 
quickly overwhelmed.129   
 The authors finalized NIJ212280 with seven recommendations as 
summarized here:130 
• Law enforcement should become a full partner in protecting America’s 
agriculture and food system. Lists a series of support items that he 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should provide to the state and 
local level  
  
129. Ibid., 151. 
130. Ibid., 151–155. 
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• Law enforcement around the country should implement proactive 
measures and preventative strategies for Agroterrorism. The three 
programs implemented in the study serve as program templates that can be 
used by other agencies including the Agro-Guard program, the Regional 
Response Teams for threats to the livestock industry, and the Smuggled-
Food Interdiction Teams.  
• These local preventive measures and programs should be funded by 
Federal appropriations within the DHS budget.  
• The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) should expand its illegal meat 
products interdiction program. 
• The National Animal Identification System (NAIS) that is now a voluntary 
program should be a mandatory, national program in order to assist law 
enforcement and epidemiologists in tracing the origin of an animal disease 
outbreak.  
• Agroterrorism related information should be designated a specific program 
within the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) intelligence 
database available to law enforcement. Local law enforcement should 
engage in developing information sources and intelligence concerning 
threats to agriculture. 
• DHS should create, provide, and fund Agroterrorism awareness training 
for law enforcement. 
 
E. APPLICABILITY TO FLORIDA 
Many of the specific recommendations outlined in NIJ212280 were directed at the 
federal government level. The study included recommendations for enhancing DHS 
programs and training initiatives, USDA programs, mandated nationwide regulations, and 
federal funding. Those elements focused on the federal level were outside the scope of 
this thesis. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the study focusing on the 
state and local level have potential applicability to Florida. The following questions were 
developed from NIJ212280 to analyze Florida law enforcement’s capacity to accomplish 
their roles and responsibilities in the prevention and response to agroterrorism: 
• Is there a strategy for identifying threats to, and assessing the vulnerability 
of, the agriculture community in Florida? 
• Does the capacity exist in Florida to effectively collect, analyze, and 
disseminate agriculture related information and intelligence? 
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• Is there a community policing strategy in the Florida agriculture
community?  NIJ212280 recommends the Agro-Guard model.
• In the event of an FAD event response, does the capacity exist to
simultaneously handle the animal health related issues, as well as manage
crime scene and evidentiary requirements and conduct a criminal
investigation, if required. NIJ212280 recommends establishment of a
RRT.
• Does Florida law enforcement possess the capacity to enforce quarantines
and stop movement plans in the event of an FAD event?
• Does Florida engage in the interdiction of illegally imported and possibly
contaminated food products?  NIJ212280 recommends establishment of a
SFIT.
• Are agroterrorism trainings available and/or being delivered to Florida law
enforcement?
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IV. THE FLORIDA ASSESSMENT 
In the course of researching Florida law enforcement’s role in defending against 
agroterrorism, several entities and programs were identified as having a primary role in 
this endeavor. Included among these were the Florida Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services (FDACS) and several sub-divisions and programs, including the 
Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement (OALE), Division of Animal Industry (DAI), 
Division of Food Safety (DFS), and the State Agricultural Response Team (SART). Also 
included at the state level were the Florida Fusion Center (FFC) and the Regional 
Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF). Local level involvement included Florida 
Sheriff’s Offices, primarily via the Florida Agriculture Crimes Intelligence Unit 
(FACIU). The functions of these entities and programs were analyzed within the context 
of the questions identified in Chapter III to analyze Florida law enforcement’s capacity to 
accomplish their roles and responsibilities in the prevention and response to 
agroterrorism. 
A. OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA AGRICULTURE 
Before delving deeply into Florida law enforcement’s roles in agroterrorism, it is 
beneficial to gain some perspective into the importance of the agriculture industry to the 
State. Florida may be best known for its gleaming white sand beaches and thrilling 
amusement parks, however agriculture and farming have been and continue to be vital, 
consistent industries contributing to the State’s economic success. Agriculture is the most 
stable, leading segment of Florida’s economy, coming in second in size and importance 
behind tourism.131  Florida’s farm industry alone includes 47,500 farms, spread across 
9.25 million acres, growing three hundred different crops.132  The larger inclusive 
131. Larry Williams, “Impact of Florida Agriculture” (University of Florida, January 30, 2002), 
http://leon.ifas.ufl.edu/ag/Impact_of_Florida_Agriculture.pdf. 
132. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Florida Agriculture Statistical Directory 2013 
(Tallahassee, FL,), 7 http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Florida/Publications/
Agriculture_Statistical_Directory/2013/2013%20FL%20Ag%20by%20the%20Numbers%28FASD%29.pdf. 
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agriculture industry (including timberland) covers 24 million acres or two-thirds of the 
State of Florida.133   
Alan Hodges, agricultural economist at the University of Florida’s Institute of 
Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS), describes the three principle measures of 
economic activity as output, employment, and value added impact.134  In 2010, the 
combined agriculture industries in Florida contributed $109 billion in value added impact 
to the state economy representing over 10 percent of the state gross domestic product, 
and provided the state with over 2 million jobs.135 To give these figures the proper 
perspective, consider that Florida is a state with a population of about 19 million and 
Gross State Product of $704 billion.136 Agriculture is a vital industry and one of the key 
components of Florida’s economy. Florida’s economy stands as the fourth largest in the 
United States, making the state and its economic contribution of tremendous national 
importance.137 
In 2011, Florida ranked first in the U.S. for production of oranges, grapefruit, 
sweet corn, squash, watermelons, and fresh market tomatoes, snap beans, and 
cucumbers.138 Total cash receipts for Florida agriculture that year totaled $8.26 billion139 
with fresh market crops accounting for $1.1 billion; second in the U.S. behind 
California.140  Livestock is an integral part of Florida agriculture. Records for 2012 listed 
133. Chuck Woods, “Florida’s Ag Economy Thriving,” Southeast Farm Press, May 21, 2008, 
http://southeastfarmpress.com/floridas-ag-economy-thriving-0. 
134. Ibid. 
135. Alan W Hodges, Mohammad Rahmani, and Thomas J Stevens, “Economic Contributions of Agriculture, 
Natural Resources, and Related Industries in Florida for 2010” (University of Florida), accessed August 15, 2013:12. 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Florida/Publications/Agriculture_Statistical_Directory/2013/
2013%20FL%20Ag%20by%20the%20Numbers%28FASD%29.pdf. 
136. “Florida QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau,” United States Census Bureau, accessed August 20, 2013, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12000.html. 
137. “Florida GDP Size and Rank,” Econpost.com, January 12, 2010, http://econpost.com/floridaeconomy/florida-
gdp-size-rank. 
138. Florida Department of Agriculture and Services, Florida Agriculture Statistical Directory 2013:7. 
139. Ibid., 2013:13. 
140. Ibid., 2013:7. 
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1.66 million head of cattle of which 900,000 were beef cows and 123,000 were milk 
cows.141  Livestock is roughly a $1.5 billion dollar industry in Florida.142  
While Florida agriculture products are shipped and enjoyed all around the United 
States, exports to foreign countries consume the bulk of the production with $4 billion in 
export receipts. In 2012, Florida ranked seventh nationwide in agriculture exports. Fresh 
and frozen meat products topped the list of exported products. The findings of the 
Literature Review in examining the consensus of opinion from experts in the field, as 
well as the findings of NIJ212280, all have concluded an FAD such as FMD to be the 
primary threat to agriculture. Experiences with livestock FAD outbreaks around the globe 
such as the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001, as well as the BSE outbreak 
in the United States in 2003, have resulted in devastation to those nations’ livestock 
industries and related exports. The importance of the agriculture industry in the State of 
Florida cannot be overstated, nor can the potential threat of harm. 
A few years ago FDACS sought to answer how harmful the threat to agriculture 
could be and completed a cost study of the economic damage resulting from a large-scale 
animal disease event, either naturally occurring or an agroterror attack. Estimated costs 
and losses are as follows:  $1.8 billion for the slaughter of animals, $1 billion in farm 
disinfection costs, $658 million in animal disposal costs, $78 million for business 
recovery, $21 million in marketing support, $4 billion in lost agriculture industry 
revenue, and a 20% hit to Florida’s tourism industry. At $107 billion for direct tourism 
revenues a 20% loss would be $21.4 billion. Totaling these figures brings a grand total 




143. Amanda Hodges and Rick Sapp, “SART Workbook:  The Threat of Agroterrorism and Bioterrorism in 
Florida – Prevention and a Coordinated Response” (Tallahassee, FL:  Florida State Agricultural Response Team, 
2006): 11, http://www.flsart.org/pdf/Workbook%20Agroterrorism.pdf. 
The estimated costs for an animal disease event in Florida were cited from the SART Workbook, however the 
original source for this data could not be ascertained.I t is unclear how these cost estimates were calculated. 
 39 
                                                 
B. FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE RESPONSE 
If all prevention efforts fail and an FAD outbreak occurs, there will be a response 
to contain and eradicate the disease spread, as well as to investigate criminality, if 
involved. NIJ212280 recommended deployment of a Rapid Response Team comprised of 
animal health and law enforcement officials in order to address the animal health and 
outbreak elements, as well as manage crime scene, evidence, and criminal investigation if 
needed. In Florida, an FAD event falls under the statutory authority of FDACS. Florida 
State Statutes (FSS) chapter 585 establishes the Division of Animal Industry (DAI) and 
empowers DAI with regulatory authority and jurisdiction over livestock and large 
animals within the state with the exception of wild game and zoo or carnival animals.144  
FSS 585.145(1) and 585.16 establish the division’s authorities in dealing with and 
responding to an animal disease event: 
585.145(1) Control of animal diseases. 
The department shall take such measures as may be necessary and proper 
for the control, suppression, eradication, and prevention of the spread of 
contagious, infectious, and communicable disease and to protect animals 
in the state. The department shall also quarantine such animals as it shall 
find, or have reason to believe, to be infected with or exposed to any such 
disease.145 
585.16 Powers of division in connection with certain diseases. 
Whenever the department determines, pursuant to s. 585.15, that a pest or 
disease is dangerous and transmissible, or whenever the department 
determines it necessary or advisable to dip, examine, test, identify, treat, or 
destroy an animal or other property defined in s. 585.08(4), the division or 
its representatives and agents may dip, examine, test, identify, treat, or 
destroy any infected, exposed, suspected, or susceptible animal and any 
goods, products, or materials that may carry contagion, or may quarantine 
on or in, for or against any premises, areas, or localities within the state.146 
144. “Animal Industry,” F.S.S. Ch. 585, accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2013/
585.08. 
145. “Control of Animal Diseases,” F.S.S. Ch. 585.145, accessed July 15, 2014, http://leg.state.fl.us/statutes/
index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0500-0599/0585/Sections/0585.145.html. 




                                                 
These statutes authorize DAI to take any measure necessary to control and eradicate 
animal diseases including quarantining, testing, and destroying animals if required. Other 
subsections in chapter 585 require the reporting of animal diseases to DAI and establish 
animal testing laboratories under the division. 
In the event an animal is found infected with an FAD, the FDACS would be 
notified and respond pursuant to state law. The response effort would be conducted 
according to the FDACS Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response Plan (FAD-
ERP).147  This is a 38-page document, which covers responsibilities and authorities and 
concept of operations for preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. The State 
Agricultural Response Team (SART) is noted as a key component of preparation for an 
FAD event. The SART mission, as stated in the FAD-ERP, is “to develop and implement 
procedures and train participants to facilitate a safe, environmentally sound, and efficient 
response to agriculture emergencies or disasters at the county, district, and state 
levels.”148  Depending on the size and growth of the event, other components of Florida’s 
emergency management apparatus could come into play as well, such as activation of the 
State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and the Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan (CEMP).149  If an event of this magnitude occurred, the governor 
would probably declare a state of emergency by executive order. 
The response section of the FAD-ERP includes details of all aspects of an FAD 
including how detection and assessment of the disease would occur, notifications made, 
and activations and deployments will be implemented. The plan states the Incident 
Command System (ICS) will be followed with a Unified Command to be established 
with the state and USDA. Implementation and enforcement of quarantines is covered, as 
well as vaccination methodology. agroterrorism or other criminal acts associated with the 
FAD are not addressed in the plan. However, the response procedures to an FAD event, 
whether naturally occurring or intentional, are largely the same. The one difference 
147. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response 
Plan (Tallahassee, FL, January 11, 2013). 
148. Ibid., 13. 
149. Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 
accessed August 1, 2014, http://floridadisaster.org/cemp.htm. 
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would be the law enforcement investigation that would accompany a response effort to an 
agroterrorism or criminal act. There are two references to law enforcement in the plan. It 
is noted that OALE or other law enforcement personnel could be assigned to guard 
facility entrances. In the Quarantines section it is noted that law enforcement would be 
required to enforce established zone perimeters.150 
OALE authorities are provided for in FSS 570.073, Department of Agriculture 
and Consumer Services, law enforcement officers. The key elements of this statute to 
note are found in section (1) granting OALE officers primary responsibility for 
agriculture-related law enforcement and having jurisdiction over laws pertaining to the 
security and safety of Florida’s agriculture. This statute grants OALE officers with same 
police powers as those bestowed on all other law enforcement entities in the state with 
the authority to enforce any state law. The primary responsibilities set forth by the statute 
place OALE in the position to support all FDACS responsibilities and functions in a law 
enforcement capacity. This statute may be reviewed in its entirety in Appendix A.  
However, while OALE is duly authorized and does support these FDACS 
missions, including response to an FAD event if requested, OALE has no mission focus 
on agroterrorism. The OALE Power DMS system is where policies and training bulletins 
are housed. A search of this system with the term “Agroterrorism” found no search 
results. A search of this system with the term “terrorism” found seven search results, 
none of which were related to agroterrorism.151 
The SART is a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) group coordinating partner 
entities for the animal and agriculture sector into an ICS specialty team for all-hazard 
response for incidents involving animals or the agriculture industry. The SART Standard 
Operations Guide (SOG) specifically identifies their activation for high consequence 
animal disease events and manmade or intentional acts and terrorism events including 
chemical, biological, radiologic, nuclear, and explosive incidents that involve animals or 
the agriculture industry. The Team Concept of Operations identifies FDACS as the lead 
150. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response 
Plan. 
151. Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, Written Directives. 
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agency and provides an IC structure. The SOG does not include a law enforcement 
component.152  SART teams are found in every region and SART members are located in 
every county of the state capable of responding to any animal or agriculture related 
incident.   
SART does not have an official membership role and could not place a number on 
how exactly how many members are associated with the group. As a MAC group SART 
is not a closed membership team, but is instead a coordinator of thirty-three partner 
agencies and associations who can supply skilled help depending on the nature of the 
emergency. For instance, if the event called for the need to round up thousands of head of 
cattle roaming across hundreds of acres, SART would call the Florida Cattleman’s 
Association and ask for a response of X number cowboys and mounts. The specialty 
teams are known quantities. SART has a 20-man large animal technical rescue team in 
each of the state’s seven regions. Over 1200 volunteers around the state have been trained 
for the small animal rescue teams. SART’s VetCore program includes a core of 200 
private veterinarians who are trained and committed to responding to assist as needed.   
The SART website receives about 40,000 hits per month and has over 1,000 
volunteers signed up for access to the members-only portion of the site.153  The team’s 
SOG Equipment Appendix lists the deployable equipment staged around the state, which 
includes FAD response trailers, Incident Command Post trailers, Mobile Animal 
Response Equipment units, Large Animal Rescue units, and various other response, 
communication, and maintenance equipment.154 SART also has access to a mobile 
laboratory for conducting tests in the field.   
In the event that the governor declares a state of emergency and the SEOC is 
stood up, the roles within the center will be filled in accordance with the Emergency 
Support Functions (ESF) as described in the FEMA National Response Framework 
152. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, State Agricultural Response Team Standard 
Operations Guide (Tallahassee, FL, April 2013). 
153. “Florida State Agricultural Response Team,” accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.flsart.org/. 
154. State Agricultural Response Team Standard Operations Guide, Appendix A. 
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(NRF).155  The FEMA model includes fifteen ESFs each of which supports a different 
aspect of a response, event, or disaster, such as communications, firefighting, and public 
safety. The Florida ESF model as found in the CEMP is an expansion over the federal 
model with eighteen ESFs. ESF-17 is for Animal and Agricultural Issues with a 
responsibility to: 
Coordinate the state’s response for animal and agricultural issues in case 
of an emergency or disaster situation. To accomplish this goal, Emergency 
Support Function 17 oversees the emergency management functions of 
preparedness, recovery, mitigation, and response with all agencies and 
organizations that are involved with the state’s response activities.156  
FDACS takes the lead role for the ESF-17 function, and SART directly supports this 
function as well.   
C. QUARANTINES AND STOP MOVEMENT ENFORCEMENT 
NIJ212280 identified the capability to effectively enforce quarantines and stop 
movements as a significant challenge for most states and most law enforcement 
organizations. The ability to enact effective quarantines and enforce restrictions on 
animal movements are integral components to a disease outbreak response. Florida is 
unique in this topic due both to geography and having a large state law enforcement 
entity dedicated to agriculture enforcement, OALE. Authorities for enacting animal 
related quarantines and stop movements are established by state statute in chapter 585, 
Animal Industry. FSS 585.05(1) authorizes the FDACS Division of Animal Industry 
(DAI) to: 
 Establish, maintain, and enforce quarantine areas within the state, or the 
entire state. The department may restrict, regulate, or prohibit the 
movement or transportation of animals found, determined, or suspected by 
it to be carriers of any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease, or 
of the vectors of such disease, into, from, and within such quarantine 
areas, when necessary for the prevention, control, or eradication of any 
155. “National Response Framework,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed August 1, 2014, 
http://www.fema.gov/national-response-framework. 
156. Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, appendix, page 1. 
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contagious, infectious, or communicable disease among domestic or wild 
animals, or for carrying out any of the other purposes of this chapter.157 
Having established a legal mechanism for enacting quarantines or restricting animal 
movements is common to most states. As pointed out in NIJ212280, the difficult task is 
in effectively enforcing these orders. 
In an FAD outbreak, quarantines would be established in accordance with the 
Florida FAD-ERP and USDA APHIS requirements. USDA could place the entire state 
under quarantine, unless the extent of the outbreak could be confirmed to a smaller 
geographic area, in which case zone quarantines would be established.158  Seven 
designated zone and area types are included in the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease 
Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP).159  The zones requiring law enforcement 
engagement include the Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, and Surveillance Zone. The Infected 
Zone is set a minimum of three kilometers beyond the perimeter of the outbreak location. 
The Buffer Zone is set a minimum of seven kilometers outside the perimeter of the 
Infected Zone. The Infected Zone and Buffer Zone combine to form the Control Area. 
Strict movement controls will be in place inside the Control Area requiring enough law 
enforcement presence to enforce the quarantines as determined by the geography, 
roadways, and amount of traffic.160 
The USDA Zone Map in Figure 4 depicts how quarantine zones would be set 
around infected areas in a typical large regional outbreak (as taken from USDA FMD 
Response Ready Reference Guide–Understanding Response Strategies). 
157. “Animal Industry.” 
158. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response 
Plan. 
159. United States Department of Agriculture, APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework Response Strategies.F 





                                                 
  
Figure 4. FMD Outbreak Type 3.161 
While minimum perimeter sizes are noted for these zones, in actuality, the sizes could 
extend much farther, depending on the size and type of the outbreak. The FAD-E 
RP notes the Infected Zone or Red Zone should be a minimum of 10 kilometers outside 
the perimeter in the case of an FMD outbreak. The Surveillance Zone or Yellow Zone is 
set outside the infected areas, and animal movements with permits are allowed to transit 
this zone. Law Enforcement would be required in the Surveillance Zone to check for and 
enforce the permit requirements.162  Florida law enforcement must be prepared to enforce 
stop movements and quarantine zones in several scenarios. These range from entire state 
quarantines where movements of all susceptible species are prohibited throughout the 
state to small area quarantines to regional areas with multiple zone enforcement 
requirements. 
161. United States Department of Agriculture, FMD Response - Understanding Response Strategies (Washington, 
DC, August 2013), 6. http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/
fmd_rrg_understanding_strategies.pdf. 
162. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Response 
Plan.  
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FDACS and OALE have extensive experience and capabilities in enforcing 
quarantines and stop movements on agriculture. Animal quarantine actions are not an 
unusual event in Florida and are routinely enforced at OALE stations. The OALE 
Uniform Bureau operates 23 interdiction stations on 19 highways regulating the flow of 
cargo and agriculture products in and out of Florida 24 hours a day 365 days a year.163 
The OALE interdiction station locations are shown on the map in Figure 5 (as taken from 
the OALE website). 
 
Figure 5. OALE Interdiction Station map.164 
The interdiction stations are strategically positioned to ensure that all cargo moving in 
and out of the agriculture production regions of the state must pass through a station. 
Florida’s natural geographic boot shape and waterways result in 19 bridges providing 
access from North Florida into the primary agriculture regions of the state. This makes 
for an effective state quarantine and movement restriction enforcement capability. 
According to the FDACS Animal Shipment Violations report from January 1, 
2013, to December 31, 2013, OALE enforced 231 quarantines on livestock shipments at 
their interdiction stations.165  During this time period, nearly 1 million animals passed 
163. “ Bureau of Uniform Services,” Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, accessed July 11, 2014, 
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/Divisions-Offices/Agricultural-Law-Enforcement/Bureau-of-Uniform-Services. 
164. Ibid. 
165. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Animal Shipment Violations (Tallahassee, FL, 
accessed July 29, 2014). 
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through the OALE interdiction stations transiting in and out of Florida, all of which had 
to pass through one of these stations in order to get into or out of the primary agriculture 
and livestock production areas of the state.166  
Local enforcement of zone quarantines could potentially become a more 
complicated issue, as would the case of an outbreak in the panhandle beyond the security 
of the interdiction station network. These scenarios would require officers and vehicles 
on the ground with the capability of enforcing the quarantines across geographic zones 
without the benefit of the interdiction stations. FDACS and OALE have extensive 
experience with this scenario as well. In 1995, the citrus canker bacterial disease was 
found infecting trees in Miami. The canker quickly began spread across South Florida 
infecting 24 counties. With Florida’s citrus industry on the line, FDACS threw a massive 
response effort at the outbreak, including local and regional zone quarantines and 
eradication very similar to the response protocols to an FMD outbreak. The response 
efforts were working to contain the canker outbreak, until the hurricanes of 2004 and 
2005 blew the disease all across the state rendering eradication impossible.167 
D. INTERDICTION OF CONTAMINATED FOOD PRODUCTS 
One of the recommendations from NIJ212280 was to establish smuggled food 
interdiction teams in order to identify potentially contaminated food products of foreign 
origin, which have the potential to spread FADs such as FMD. Responsibilities, 
authorities, and regulatory programs were examined in Florida in order to evaluate the 
State’s engagement in interdicting contaminated food products. Responsibility for 
166.  Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Animal Inshipments and Outshipments 
(Tallahassee, FL, accessed July 29, 2014). 




“Citrus Canker Fact Sheet,” Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, accessed July 31, 2014, 
http://www.freshfromflorida.com/Divisions-Offices/Plant-Industry/Pests-Diseases/Citrus-Health-Response-Program/
Citrus-Canker/Citrus-Canker-FAQs. 
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Comprehensive Report on Citrus Canker in Florida 
(Tallahassee, FL, December 2012), http://www.freshfromflorida.com/content/download/24084/487233/
cankerflorida.pdf. 
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regulation of food products in Florida is divided between three state agencies as specified 
in state statutes to include FDACS, Florida Department of Health (DOH), and Florida 
Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The rolls these entities 
play were examined individually. 
FSS 381.0072 assigns DOH with responsibility for inspecting and ensuring the 
safety of food products served in certain establishments. The DOH website describes 
their area of responsibility as institutional type establishments with food service 
operations, such as schools, assisted living facilities, detention facilities, and some bars 
and theatres.168  Inspection standards and requirements are outlined in FAC 64E-11.169 
DBPR is mandated with regulating and ensuring food safety standards in 
restaurants as specified in FSS chapter 509. The Division of Hotels and Restaurants 
licenses and inspects all public lodging and food service establishments with the 
exception of those specifically tasked to DOH.170  The Division regulates 85,000 
facilities in Florida in accordance with the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) 2009 Food Code standards.171  According to the DBPR Division of Hotels and 
Restaurants Annual Report:  FY 2012–2013 the division’s 296 inspectors conducted 
160,807 inspections resulting in 752,041 violations cited.172 
With the regulation of all prepared food service venues being covered by DOH 
and DBPR, the remaining food safety concerns focus on food products being transported 
into the state and those being sold and marketed at grocery, meat, and other retailers. 
These food safety responsibilities fall under the purview of FDACS as directed by the 
168. “Food Safety and Sanitation,” Florida Department of Health, accessed July 11, 2014, 
http://www.floridahealth.gov/%5C/healthy-environments/food-safety-and-sanitation/index.html. 
169. “Food Hygiene,” F.A.C. Code 64E-11, 1996. 
170. “Division of Hotels and Restaurants,” Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, accessed 
July 11, 2014, http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/hr/index.html. 
171. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants Annual 
Report:  FY20122 –01,3 (Tallahassee, FL, 2013). http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/hr/reports/annualreports/
documents/ar2012_13.pdf. 
172. Ibid., 2. 
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Florida Food Safety Act, FSS chapter 500.173  The Division of Food Safety (DFS) is 
tasked with carrying out these statutory requirements. DFS responsibilities, as noted on 
their webpage, include the following: 
The Division of Food Safety is responsible for assuring the public of a 
safe, wholesome and properly represented food supply through permitting 
and inspection of food establishments, inspection of food products, and 
performance of specialized laboratory analyses on a variety of food 
products sold or produced in the state. The division monitors food from 
farm gate through processing and distribution to the retail point of 
purchase. 
The division is charged with administration and enforcement of the food 
and poultry and egg laws, and also provides support in the enforcement of 
other food safety laws. In addition to regulatory surveillance and 
enforcement, the division evaluates consumer complaints related to 
food.174 
By virtue of the Florida Food Safety Act FDACS is the lead agency charged with 
regulating and overseeing the state’s food supply. FSS 500.60 specifically tasks FDACS 
with responsibility for ensuring health and safety standards and regulation of meat, 
poultry, and fish products.175  FSS 500.601 specifies FDACS regulatory authority over 
the retail sale of meat.176 The interdiction of meat products illegally transported into the 
U.S. and then sold to the public was the specific concern identified in NIJ212280 
resulting in the establishment of SFIT teams. 
FDACS regulation of food and meat products is accomplished in three layers. The 
first line of defense is the OALE interdiction station network at the state entry points, 
proactive inspection of retail sales establishments, and reacting to consumer complaints. 
173. “Food Products,” Florida Food Safety Act, F.S.S. Ch. 500, accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.leg.state.fl.us/
Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0500-0599/0500/
0500ContentsIndex.html&StatuteYear=2012&Title=-%3E2012-%3EChapter%20500. 
174. “Division of Food Safety,” Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, accessed July 11, 
2014, http://www.freshfromflorida.com/Divisions-Offices/Food-Safety. 
175. “Regulation of Meat Preempted to State,” Florida Food Safety Act F.S.S. 500.60, accessed July 11, 2014, 
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0500-0599/0500/
Sections/0500.60.html. 




                                                 
OALE inspects all shipments of food entering the state at their interdiction stations armed 
with DFS standards and regulations. OALE authorities to enforce DFS regulations are 
provided via FSS 570.073 granting statutory authority to support all FDACS 
responsibilities and functions in a law enforcement capacity.177 The DFS form entitled 
Food Safety Inspections Guidelines At Interdiction Stations provides guidance for OALE 
inspections and enforcement actions of food products. The form specifies regulated 
products and the required temperatures, packaging and labeling standards, and other 
requirements such as cross contamination.178  Additionally, all OALE sworn personnel 
have received food safety enforcement training as found in Training Bulletin 2012–04 
Food Safety Training in the OALE Policy and Procedures.179  During the fiscal year 
dates of July 01, 2012, to June 30, 2013, OALE discovered and enforced thirty-two food 
safety related violations at their interdiction stations on food products entering Florida.180 
The Division of Food Safety conducts regular inspections of food retailers such as 
grocery, meat, food processors, convenience stores, truck stops and other retail 
establishments. DFS employs 140 inspectors who have responsibility and authority over 
48,000 permitted establishments.181  OALE Investigations Bureau supports DFS if law 
enforcement action is or could be required in conjunction with their regulatory function 
and routinely accompanies DFS on inspection and enforcement assignments. Table 1 
displays OALE investigations in support of food safety enforcement actions for the first 





177. “Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Law Enforcement Officers.” 
178. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Food Safety Inspections Guidelines At 
Interdiction Station,  (Tallahassee, FL, 2012). 
179. Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, Written Directives, TB 2012–04. 
180. Tim Rutherford, Monthly Report (Tallahassee, FL, July 2013). 
181.  Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, Written Directives, TB 2012–04. 
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DATE CASE # CASE TYPE 01-29-14 14-274 Arrest made for violation of stop sale order 02-10-14 14-384 Assist other agency with stop sale order at dairy 03-06-14 14-669 Assist other agency with intentional tampering of meat 
product resulting in death investigation 03-21-14 14-875 Assist DFS with unlicensed fish/seafood processing  04-03-14 14-1051 Arrest made for violation of stop sale order 04-14-14 14-1179 Assist DFS with dairy inspection of out of service 
equipment 04-18-14 14-1230 Assist DFS with food handling complaint of business 04-18-14 14-1233 Assist DFS with consumer complaint of fish products 04-23-14 14-1307 Assist DFS with stop sale order on business 04-24-14 14-1318 Assist DFS with dairy inspection of out of service 
equipment 04-30-14 14-1398 Assist DFS with consumer complaint of meat products 05-05-14 14-1466 Assist DFS with investigation of misbranded product 05-08-14 14-1501 Assist DFS with food handling and sanitation investigation 
   
Table 1.   OALE Investigations in Support of Food Safety182 
Many of these cases reflect routine inspections or enforcement actions on the part 
of DFS, where OALE has accompanied inspectors to provide a law enforcement 
capability if needed. In two of these cases OALE investigators made arrests for criminal 
charges on the subjects involved. Case 14-274 involved a business wherein DFS had 
placed a stop sale order and seizure order on the food products within, and the subject 
had unlawfully removed the stop sale orders and products. Case 14-1051 involved a 
business that had previously been issued stop sale orders for the sale of uninspected and 
unbranded food products. The subject was found in possession of more of the same 
products.183 
 
182. “ACISS Case Management,” Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement (accessed July 11, 2014). 
183. Ibid. 
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E. THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS  
Identification of threats and assessment of vulnerabilities in the agriculture 
industry is incorporated into this community policing approach. Research was conducted 
into Florida’s domestic security strategy to analyze how Florida approaches these issues. 
Florida’s domestic security strategic governance is a multi-jurisdictional, multi-discipline 
layered structure comprised of seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF), 
a State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness comprised of RDSTF members, Urban 
Area Security Initiative representatives, and other subject matter experts, and the 
Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC). The DSOC serves as an executive level 
advisory to the governor and legislature as well as guidance and oversight to the RDSTF 
and SWG. The DSOC, in collaboration with the SWG, establishes Florida’s domestic 
security strategy as codified in the Domestic Security Strategic Plan (DSSG).184 
The Domestic Security Strategic Plan provides “a blueprint for comprehensive, 
enterprise-wide planning for domestic security efforts…guidance for the use of federal, 
state, local, and private resources within the state before, during, and after events or 
incidents, whether natural or man-made, to include terrorism…serves as the basis for 
requesting funds.”185  The plan is based upon and tied to the DHS Target Capabilities 
List and the National Priorities. The Strategic Plan contains five goals including Prepare, 
Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover. Goal 3 is to Protect Florida’s Citizens, Visitors, 
and Critical Infrastructure. Goal 3 includes five Objectives. The first two of these 
Objectives are Objective 3.1 Critical Infrastructure Protection and Objective 3.2 Food 
and Agriculture Safety and Defense.  
With Objectives 3.1 and 3.2 of the Strategic Plan the need for vulnerability 
assessments in the agriculture industry, as outlined in NIJ212280, were articulated as a 
priority in Florida’s domestic security strategy. These Objectives may be reviewed in 
184. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2011 Domestic Security Annual Report (Tallahassee, FL, 
December 31, 2011). http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/ec16ac6a-13a7-40a8-8123-f0e52e749783/FINAL-
2011-DS-Annual-Report.aspx. 
185. Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Domestic Security Oversight Council, Florida Domestic Security 
Strategic Plan 2012 - 2014 (Tallahassee, FL, July 15, 2011), 5. http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/13b174e9-
e137-41b0-98fc-09b846bc8cdb/StrategicPlanandFundingStrategyOctober2001.aspx. 
 53 
                                                 
their entirety in Appendix B. Florida’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy is, “To 
strengthen Florida’s terrorism prevention and preparedness efforts by identifying, 
prioritizing, and assessing the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastructure in this State, and 
developing effective strategies for strengthening their security and protection.”186 The 
Critical Infrastructure Program was stood up in 2002 under the RDSTFs to implement 
this strategy.187 The RDSTFs are configured across Florida as depicted in Figure 6 (as 
taken from the 2012 Domestic Security Annual Report). 
  
Figure 6. Regional Domestic Security Task Force Map188 
Until 2014, there were seven critical infrastructure planner positions across the 
state with six assigned to each of the RDSTFs and one statewide planner, who were 
186. “BUSINESSAFE,” Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 6, accessed July 14, 2014, http://gtbacp.com/
presentations/BSAFE_TBR_version_03302010.pdf. 
187. Sylvia Ifft, “Florida’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Program,” The CIP Report:  George Mason 
University Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security 13, no. 1 (July 2014): 21. http://cip.gmu.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2013/06/CIPHS_TheCIPReport_July2014_State_and_Tribal.pdf 
188. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2012 Domestic Security Annual Report (Tallahassee, FL, 
December 31, 2012), 4, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/Publications/Documents/Domestic-Security/2012-DS-
Annual-Report.aspx. 
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tasked with coordinating resources to implement critical infrastructure training, conduct 
vulnerability assessments, provide support and recommendations for critical 
infrastructure protection, and identify and develop infrastructure protection initiatives.189 
The critical infrastructure planner positions are currently being phased out in Florida due 
to funding issues. The planner duties are being shifted to the RDSTF planners who will 
have to continue regional planning responsibilities as well as assume the critical 
infrastructure responsibilities. 
A similar capability is also provided via the five DHS Protective Service Advisors 
assigned to Florida, who focus on nationally significant infrastructure, while the state 
planners focus on the state and local level.190  Until 2014, assessment data were input 
into an Automated Critical Asset Management System. This system has been 
discontinued by DHS and is currently being migrated to a new Internet based tool. 
Vulnerability assessments across the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors have 
been conducted continually since 2002, and there are therefore data sets that would have 
provided insight into the extent to which food and agriculture issues have (or have not) 
been tracked, prioritized, and addressed. For a variety of political, organizational, and 
technical reasons that data sets are as of this writing inaccessible. Had they been available 
for analysis, they would presumably have confirmed anecdotal evidence that suggests no 
attention to these issues.  
F. AGRICULTURE COMMUNITY POLICING 
The NIJ212280 makes an argument for adapting the community-policing model 
specifically to the agriculture community and offers the Agro-Guard concept used in 
Kansas as a potential template. The SART group has a role in target hardening the 
agriculture sector as stated in the SART Project Information worksheet for the State 
Homeland Security Grant Program. As taken from the Strategy section, “SART partners 
with agriculture responders and producers to develop and train on planning, prevention 
and biosecurity. Active awareness and protective actions in the agricultural community 
189. Ifft, “Florida’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Program.” 
190. Ibid. 
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help defend the supply chain to reduce food safety threats and attempts at 
agroterrorism.”191 Additionally, SART meets with each of the sixty-seven Florida 
counties each year regarding food and agriculture defense, conducts monthly advisory 
board meetings, quarterly team meetings, publishes a monthly newsletter, meets with the 
regional RDSTFs, coordinates with the veterinary community including a yearly training 
event, and provides twenty-five FEMA courses around the state including a large animal 
technical rescue workshop.,192193 
While these SART efforts do not include critical infrastructure assessments, they 
do demonstrate the high level of engagement SART has in the agriculture sector and 
community. This seems to reflect the closest representation to an agriculture community-
policing model, as described in NIJ212280, to be found at this time in the State of 
Florida. However, SART lacks a law enforcement component. Another organization that 
appears to have some community policing aspect to it is the FACIU.   
The FACIU has primarily an intelligence and information-sharing mission and is 
comprised of thirty-six different Florida law enforcement agency partners.194  The 
FACIU also has non-sworn government entity members through the USDA and FDACS, 
as well as having some private sector partners in the agriculture industry through some of 
the larger stakeholders such as Ben Hill Griffin and Lykes Ranch.195 FACIU has the law 
enforcement component that SART lacks, but does not have a community-policing 
mission. The FACIU does have direct ties to the agriculture community though, primarily 
via its local county sheriffs members.   
191. Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, SART Project Information (Tallahassee, FL, 2014), 5. 
192. Ibid 
193. Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement, SART Project Development Template Budget Detail Worksheet 
(Tallahassee, FL, 2014). 




                                                 
G. AGRICULTURE INTELLIGENCE 
The concepts of information sharing between law enforcement and the agriculture 
industry and engaging in intelligence collection and dissemination specific to threats to 
agriculture came up several times in NIJ212280. Florida law enforcement entities use 
several avenues of intelligence and information sharing, including the state fusion center 
network, information sharing initiatives, and task forces. There are seven regional fusion 
centers aligned geographically with the RDSTFs with the primary state center, the 
Florida Fusion Center (FFC), located in Tallahassee. Various information-sharing 
initiatives are used around the state, including the Regional Law Enforcement Exchange 
(R-LEX), SmartCOP, Finder, and the Florida Law Enforcement eXchange (FLEX) 
project at the state level.196 SharePoint is another information sharing platform used and 
offered by the FFC.197  Multi-agency task forces are commonly used to bring disparate 
departments together to enhance the sharing of information and resources with a focus on 
a common goal or problem. Task forces in the state with missions that are not specifically 
focused on, yet could be related to agroterrorism include the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) and the Florida Agriculture Crime Intelligence Unit (FACIU). 
Fusion centers are addressed in the President’s 2010 National Security Strategy 
identifying their importance in preventing acts of terrorism by integrating intelligence, 
law enforcement, and homeland security.198  Regarding the national network of fusion 
centers, DHS states, “State and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers) serve as 
focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, 
and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, 
tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners.”199  The FFC in Tallahassee is the 
State’s primary center feeding into and sharing information between the six other 
196. “Florida Law Enforcement eXchange (FLEX),” Florida Department of Law Enforcement, accessed July 15, 
2014, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/content/getdoc/84fc2ffe-93ba-4b57-8c93-8ff4ac4a31b8/Flex-Home.aspx. 
197. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2013 Domestic Security Annual Report. (Tallahassee, FL,  
December 31, 2013), http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/e709667e-abcd-4a4a-99f3-a5b50de9d135/2013-DS-
Annual-Report-Final.aspx. 
198. Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 
May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
199. “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed July 30, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers. 
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regional fusion centers spread around the state. The FFC is Florida’s “primary fusion 
center for the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, law 
enforcement, and homeland security information.”200 
DHS further states fusion centers, “provide interdisciplinary expertise and 
situational awareness to inform decision-making…they conduct analysis and facilitate 
information sharing…”201 Fusion centers provide these services by employing an array 
of trained intelligence analysts who are subject matter experts (SME) in specific topics. 
The FFC employs approximately 35 FDLE sworn agents and intelligence analysts 
assigned full-time to the FFC. This number includes ten analysts assigned to the 24-hour 
watch center. Also participating with the FFC are part-time analysts or liaisons from 
other member agencies.   
OALE is a partner agency with the FFC and has an MOU on record for 
information exchange as well as a position assigned to the FFC in a liaison role. 
However, this role does not provide an intelligence or analytic capability. There is no 
food and agriculture sector SME assigned to the FFC. The FFC does have access to 
agriculture expertise if needed via avenues such as the OALE liaison. However, there is 
no day-to-day agriculture SME in the FFC examining information and intelligence from 
this perspective. Every Wednesday of each week an Interagency Fusion Liaison meeting 
is held at the FFC, where most of the partner agencies participate in exchange of 
information regarding current intelligence and cases. OALE does not have representation 
at this meeting. The agriculture sector focused expertise found in the FFC could be 
described as limited. 
Multiple information sharing programs are used around the state. Every law 
enforcement agency has access to at least one of these platforms. OALE criminal 
investigators use R-LEX, and a pilot program is in testing at this time using SmartCOP. 
At the state level, the FLEX project links and interconnects all of these disparate 
information-sharing platforms allowing cross dissemination of data across all regions and 
200. “Florida Fusion Center,” Florida Department of Law Enforcement, accessed July 15, 2014, 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/content/florida-fusion-center/menu/fusion-home.aspx. 
201. “State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Homeland Security. 
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partner agencies. Sharepoint, through the FFC, is not as readily accessible and is used for 
specific homeland security and intelligence purposes. Despite this access to and use of 
information sharing programs, OALE does not have trained criminal analysts and has no 
in-house agency intelligence component.  
The Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan specifically addresses intelligence 
and information sharing with the agriculture industry in Objective 3.2 – Food and 
Agriculture Safety and Defense, Step 3, as follows: 
Step 3: Coordinate and/or integrate federal, state, regional and agency 
food and agriculture alert, notification and information sharing processes 
to ensure that information about current vulnerabilities and threats is 
accessible to federal, state, regional and local government stakeholders. 
Mechanisms should also be established to enable the timely sharing of key 
information with private sector partners.202 
However, according to subject matter experts, there is no known connection point 
between anyone in the regulatory bureaus of DAI and DFS and the fusion centers. There 
is also no information exchange with the SART group and the fusion centers.  
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, run and led by the FBI, are multijurisdictional and 
multiagency partnerships focusing on terrorism investigations, issues, threats, and 
suspects.203 Florida is home to six JTTFs. Three of the groups are run out of the three 
FBI field offices, Jacksonville, Miami, and Tampa, and three are run out of sub-region 
offices in Orlando, Pensacola, and West Palm Beach.204  Of the six task forces, the South 
Florida JTTF is in the largest of the states urban areas, Miami. 
The South Florida JTTF, as described by the FBI Miami Division, “brings 
together representatives of local, state, and federal agencies to run down any and all 
terrorism leads, develop and investigate cases, provide support for special events, and 
202. Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Domestic Security Oversight Council, Florida Domestic Security 
Strategic Plan 2012 - 2014, 14. 
203. “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed July 30, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces. 
204. Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “Top Secret America.A  Washington Post Investigation,” The 
Washington Post (September 2010), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/states/florida/. 
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proactively identify threats that may impact the area and the nation.”205 The South 
Florida JTTF, based in Miami, is comprised of multiple partner agencies including, “U.S. 
Homeland Security Investigations, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, Florida Highway Patrol, Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office, Palm Beach County 
Fire Rescue, and many other local law-enforcement agencies.”206  OALE is not a 
member of any of the State’s JTTFs. 
The FACIU is a non-profit organization comprised of sworn members who 
specialize in agriculture crimes from thirty-six different law enforcement agencies in 
Florida, including federal, state, and county.207  This unit has existed since the late 1970s 
with the purpose of, “sharing information on crimes affecting the agricultural 
communities.”208 The unit “specializes in gathering and sharing information on a variety 
of state wide crimes related to the agricultural field.”209  In an interview, FACIU member 
Sgt. Bill Bevis was quoted as saying, “communication is the key to preventing and 
solving crimes.”210  In the same news article, past president of the FACIU Fred 
Tagtmeier noted sharing information is vital to success.211 
In addition to the thirty-six law enforcement agency members, the FACIU is also 
partnered with the FBI, the USDA, the FDACS, and private industry stakeholders such as 
Ben Hill Griffin and Lykes Ranch. The FACIU has an active information and intelligence 
distribution network via email to all members as well as a restricted access website for 
registered members through the FFC.212 A recent FACIU email finds 191 member 
205. “FBI Miami Division,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed July 30, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/miami/
about-us/our-partnerships/partners. 
206. John Lantigua, “Terrorism Task Force Meshes Agencies,” Palm Beach Post, May 8, 2013, 
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20130508/ARCHIVES/305081065. 
207. “News Release - FACIU Training.” 
208. “Hendry County Sheriff’s Office Sergeant Heading up State Ag Intelligence Unit,” NewsZap, July 27, 2013, 
http://florida.newszap.com/labelle/123586-113/hendry-county-sheriffs-office-sergeant-heading-up-state-ag-
intelligence-unit. 
209. “His Beat Is Agriculture Crimes,” Florida Citrus Mutual, July 25, 2011, http://irchlb.org/news/
highlandstoday_agdeputy_072511.aspx. 
210. Ann O’Phelan, “Agricultural Crime Fighters,” Tampa Tribune - Highlands Today, December 28, 2011, 
http://highlandstoday.com/business/agri-leader/2011/dec/28/lrnewso1-agricultural-crime-fighters-ar-340782/. 
211. Ibid. 
212. “Hendry County Sheriff’s Office Sergeant Heading up State Ag Intelligence Unit.” 
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recipients on the distribution list.213  A review of emails sent from the FACIU over the 
period of January 1, 2014, to September 1, 2014, finds 176 emails total. Of this number, 
sixty-two could be described as intelligence related and were primarily focused on 
agriculture crimes and thefts, legal updates, and other, similar, information of interest to 
agriculture crimes professionals. The remaining 114 emails could be described as general 
information and emails related to FACIU association business.214 
In addition to the website and email distributions the FACIU holds regular 
meetings throughout the year and a yearly annual training conference. The recorded 
minutes were reviewed for meetings dated February 20, 2014,215 April 17, 2014,216 and 
August 21, 2014.217  Approximately thirty FACIU members attended each meeting and 
each meeting included an intelligence sharing session. The minutes reflect that the 
intelligence topics shared at these meetings were all agriculture crime related. The 
FACIU held its annual training seminar this year, May 12 through May 15. A review of 
the agenda found topics focusing on livestock, sovereign citizens, navigation, and 
agriculture related crime.218  
H. AGROTERRORISM TRAINING 
The need for agroterrorism specific training for law enforcement and industry 
stakeholders was identified in NIJ212280. Law Enforcement in Florida receives training 
via four different avenues. Those avenues are through the Basic Recruit Training 
Program, state required mandatory retraining, state offered advanced training, and then 
by other means such as outside training provided by specific agencies or acquired by 
officers through other venues. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) sets 
the standards for required training for all sworn law enforcement in the state through the 
Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC). 
213. Brenda White, “Gilchrist County Sheriff’s Office,” Email message to FACIU group, September 8, 2014. 
214. “FACIU Compendium,” 2014. 
215. Brenda White, “FACIU Meeting Minutes February 20,” Email message to FACIU group, March 23, 2014. 
216. Ibid.,Ibid., April 18, 2014. 
217. Ibid.,Ibid., September 3, 2014. 
218. Ibid., April 9, 2014. 
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The Basic Recruit Training Program is the primary means of training Florida law 
enforcement officers, serving as the “Police Academy” for new, prospective officers. The 
twenty-week, 770-hour training program covers all of the topics the CJSTC has 
determined new officers need in order to begin operating as sworn officer. A review of 
the 301-page Florida CMS Law Enforcement Basic Recruit Training Program Instructor 
Guide finds no training related to agroterrorism, nor indeed any reference to terrorism.219 
The CJSTC sets periodic mandatory retraining for all certified sworn officers 
required to maintain certification.220  A review of the Florida Officer Mandatory 
Retraining Requirements training matrix document finds nine training courses; none of 
which are related to agroterrorism.221  CJSTC also provides optional advanced training 
throughout the year at training centers around the state. A review of the CJSTC 
Advanced Training Courses webpage finds forty-five offerings of 40-hour to 80-hour 
advanced training courses; none of which are related to agroterrorism.222 
Of the four avenues in which Florida law enforcement receive training, three do 
not include or offer any agroterrorism training. The fourth avenue, outside training, is 
more difficult to quantify. There are, however, some common sources for this type of 
training, such as Northwestern University and FEMA. The Northwestern University 
Center for Public Safety is a well-established national police-training provider offering 
courses throughout the country. A search through the Center for Public training webpage 
219. “Florida CMS Law Enforcement Basic Recruit Training Program,” Florida Department of Law Enforcement. 
Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, July 1, 2012), http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/
5b95cf86-1270-463c-89e3-05158a71054b/2013_LE_IG.aspx. 
220. “FDLE Officer Requirements,” Florida Department of Law Enforcement, accessed July 13, 2014, 
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/6bb26b62-3505-489d-93da-0185650c4017/Mandatory-Retraining-
requirements.aspx. 
221. “CJSTC Florida Officer Mandatory Retraining Requirements,” Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 
accessed July 13, 2014, https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/08b74938-6e0c-4ce4-9bb0-13e8a57aa5fb/
08RetrainingMatrix081308.aspx. 




                                                 
for all courses offered for management, police training and all online courses resulted in 
no agroterrorism related offerings.223   
FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate offers a wide range of training 
courses by the hundreds to first responders, emergency management, and law 
enforcement. The FEMA online course catalog offers numerous courses topically related 
to agroterrorism. These courses include Terrorism, Terrorism Intelligence Analysis, 
Terrorism Awareness and Subversive Behavior Awareness, WMD/Hazmat, Animals in 
Disaster, and Livestock in Disaster, as well as the numerous courses teaching NIMS and 
ICS.224  However, while these courses are topically related and do cross issues related to 
agroterrorism, they are more ancillary in nature to the agroterrorism training issue. These 
are not agroterrorism specific training courses. A review of the FEMA Center for 
Domestic Preparedness course catalog also found no related training.225 
The University of California–Davis Western Institute for Food Safety and 
Security (WIFSS) is perhaps not a common venue for law enforcement training, however 
in recent years, WIFSS has developed a catalog of DHS certified agroterrorism courses 
for law enforcement and other first responders.226  These courses include AWR151 
Understanding the Dangers of Agroterrorism, AWR152 Principles of Preparedness for 
Agroterrorism and Food Systems Disasters, AWR153 Principles of Detection and 
Diagnosis, AWR154 Principles of National Incident Management System, AWR155 
Principles of Frontline Response to Agroterrorism, and AWR156 Principles of Planning 
and Implementing Recovery.227  In Florida these courses are offered and taught by Grant 
223. “Course Search,” Northwestern University: Center for Public Safety, accessed July 13, 2014, 
https://registration.nucps.northwestern.edu/search.cfm?CFID=5158154&CFTOKEN=13430ddd48a90de2-E8B5B0FA-
F656-1A47-0A31C73EFECD00F2. 
224. “National Preparedness Directorate Online Course Catalog,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
accessed July 13, 2014, http://occ.training.fema.gov/occ/. 
225. “Training by Discipline | Center for Domestic Preparedness,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
accessed July 13, 2014, https://cdp.dhs.gov/training/discipline/. 
226. “Current Offerings,” Western Institute for Food Safety and Security, accessed July 13, 2014, 
http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=632. 
227. “Agroterrorism Courses,” Western Institute for Food Safety & Security, accessed August 4, 2014, 
http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6569. 
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Partners Inc.228 Full course description summaries for these training classes may be 
reviewed in Appendix C. 
The WIFSS AWR courses began being offered in 2008 in Florida.229  From 2008 
to 2011 seventy-two courses were delivered to 1,298 students. Of this number, 183 were 
sworn law enforcement members. Seventy-six of the students were from nineteen 
different sheriff’s offices and sixty were from four different state law enforcement 
agencies. Forty-nine were from OALE. Data was not available for AWR courses 
delivered in Florida since 2012. However, no course offerings could be found within the 
last two years and there are no current AWR course offerings found in Florida.230  
The University of Florida is currently in the process of designing a livestock 
course specifically for law enforcement engaged in agricultural enforcement. The course, 
Livestock Education and Certification for Agriculture Law Enforcement (LECALE), is 
still in the early testing stages. A review of the program pilot agenda finds a four-day 
program focused on the livestock industry with sections such as Animal Husbandry, 
Equine Behavior, Body Condition Scores for Cattle and Equine, and Beef and Equine 
Teaching Unit Labs. The course appears to be a comprehensive education on livestock 
for law enforcement. There is no heading for criminal activities, terrorism, or 
agroterrorism, however there is a one-hour block on Extremism and Activism.231   
 
228. “Training,” Grant Partners Inc, accessed August 4, 2014, http://grantpartnersinc.org/training/. 
229. John Terry, “Agroterrorism Data,” Email to author, September 22, 2014. 
230. Ibid. 
231. Matt Hersom, “Livestock Education and Certification for Agriculture Law Enforcement Program,” Email to 
Keith Klopfer, July 11, 2014. 
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V. GAP ANALYSIS 
In the Florida Assessment chapter, the entities and programs in Florida having a 
role in defending against agroterrorism were identified. Next, these programs were 
analyzed in the context of the questions identified in NIJ212280 as to law enforcement’s 
role in defending against agroterrorism to determine Florida’s current capabilities. In this 
chapter, Florida’s current capabilities are analyzed against the NIJ212280 recommended 
capabilities in order to identify where the gaps exist in Florida’s agroterrorism defense 
efforts. The gaps analysis was conducted under the two primary categories of law 
enforcement’s duties and responsibilities in agroterrorism, prevention and response, as 
specified in NIJ212280.232 Gaps were identified in training, which overlaps both 
prevention and response, so training was addressed separately. 
A. PREVENTION GAPS 
Law enforcement’s agroterrorism prevention responsibilities, as specified in 
NIJ212280, included identifying threats to the agriculture industry, vulnerability 
assessments, interfacing with industry stakeholders including animal health, intelligence 
and information sharing, smuggled food interdiction, and establishing a community 
policing model such as Agro-Guard in the agriculture community. Components that were 
evaluated in Florida with potential prevention responsibilities included FDACS, DAI, 
DFS, SART, OALE, and the RDSTFs. On the intelligence and information sharing side 
the FFC, FACIU, and OALE were examined.   
1. Agriculture Community Policing 
Florida does not have an established agriculture community-policing program in 
the vein of the Agro-Guard program described in NIJ212280. However, government 
outreach to the agriculture community does occur in Florida, primarily via the SART 
group. The core group of SART members employed full-time to focus on the SART 
group and its functions and missions are primarily FDACS employees with DAI. The 
232. Knowles et al., Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting American Agriculture from Agroterrorism. 
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SART oversight board and SART teams are comprised of other government, animal 
health, education, and other related industry professionals. SART exists to reach out to 
the agriculture community with a focus on preparing for responding to agriculture related 
disasters.  
While SART potentially offers a vehicle for meeting the goals described in 
NIJ212280, the big piece that is missing from SART’s outreach is the law enforcement 
component. This is a gap in comparison with the NIJ212280 model that envisioned a type 
of neighborhood watch for agriculture with a focus on prevention and information 
sharing and serving as conduit linking law enforcement with the agriculture community. 
The NIJ model includes law enforcement engaging with agriculture industry community 
members and stakeholders in an education campaign informing them on the threats to 
agriculture and encouraging the reporting of suspicious activity. In Florida, the primary 
law enforcement entities found in the local agriculture communities are the county 
sheriff’s offices.  
It is difficult if not impossible to gauge the outreach of local sheriff’s office’s 
specific to the agriculture community in their counties of jurisdiction. This could be the 
subject of another entire thesis and would require extensive polling and surveying of 
Florida’s 67 county sheriffs. However, the assessment of the FACIU found an element of 
community policing, despite their mission focus on information and intelligence sharing, 
and the FACIU membership is comprised primarily of county sheriffs office members. In 
fact twenty-nine of Florida’s sixty-seven county sheriff’s offices are represented on the 
FACIU. 
Further evidence of the FACIU’s engagement with the community was found in 
interviews. In a 2011 interview, past FACIU president Deputy Fred Tagtmeier was 
quoted as saying, “I feel like I’m a liaison person between the agricultural community 
and the sheriff’s office. You’re out there shaking hands and getting to know people, they 
are more comfortable with you…they open up…once you’ve met somebody it is easier to 
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talk to them.”233  Tagtmeier said he spends up to half of his time networking with people 
who can help him solve agriculture crimes.234   
While Florida does not have the agriculture community-policing program 
envisioned in the NIJ212280 the mechanisms appear to be in place with the SART group 
and FACIU organization to achieve this capability. There is a gap in this capability, 
however there is not a total lack of agriculture community engagement. Many of the 
aspects found in SART and the FACIU mirror the goals for the AgroGuard program as 
outlined in the NIJ study. The primary pieces missing are the lack of a focused effort 
under the banner of “agriculture community policing” and lack of a direct information 
gateway for the public. The authors of the NIJ study achieved this with AgroGuard 
community meetings and the AgroGuard signs placed throughout the communities with 
phone numbers to call with any information. 
2. Threat Identification and Vulnerability Assessments 
The State of Florida enjoys a detailed and comprehensive strategy for evaluating 
and enhancing critical infrastructure via the Domestic Security Strategic Plan. The plan 
also specifies a strategy for safety and defense, specifically of the food and agriculture 
sector. The Critical Infrastructure Program under the RDSTFs works to implement this 
strategy. From the literature review, authors Parker, Kohnen, and Chalk all discuss the 
need for threat and risk assessments for agricultural bioterrorism. However, while Florida 
has a strategy and framework in place focused on critical infrastructure, the research 
sought to confirm data indicating there has been little attention on the food and 
agriculture sector. As noted in the assessment chapter, specific data is unavailable.  
In the absence of hard data, the presumption is that there has been little focus on 
food and agriculture sector critical infrastructure assessments. This presumption is not a 
criticism of the Critical Infrastructure Program’s effectiveness. The program does not set 
the agenda for the focus on critical infrastructure. The agenda comes from direction from 
the RDSTFs on what the priorities are for critical infrastructure and from feedback and 
233. “His Beat Is Agriculture Crimes.” 
234. Ibid. 
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information from critical infrastructure partners in the state. The gap in this capability has 
been lack of prioritizing agriculture as a critical infrastructure focus from the strategic 
level as well as lack of feedback or contact from the agriculture industry articulating 
needs. The policy level direction and focus on agriculture exists as found in the DSSP. 
In a recent article in the George Mason University publication, The CIP Report, 
former Florida statewide critical infrastructure planner Sylvia Ifft wrote, “Since the 
mindset has shifted over the years from examining critical infrastructure at a capacity 
level to a consequence scenario, planners can focus on the drivers of their state’s 
economy and the needs of the population to identify and categorize critical infrastructure 
assets.”235  This quote captures the significance of the lack of focus on agriculture as a 
critical infrastructure in Florida. As outlined in the Florida Assessment chapter, 
agriculture is of tremendous economic importance to the state’s economy and population. 
There has been a gap in including agriculture in assessing Florida’s critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities. 
The critical infrastructure planner positions are currently in process of phasing 
out, with those duties shifting onto the RDSTF planners, who will be assuming the 
critical infrastructure role in additional to their regional planning duties. There is no 
projection as to how this will affect the Critical Infrastructure Program, however the great 
likelihood is this will have a detrimental effect.   
3. Intelligence and Information Sharing 
In Florida, the primary means for collecting, disseminating and sharing criminal 
and domestic security information is via the state’s seven Fusion Centers with the 
Tallahassee based Florida Fusion Center as the primary hub. Analysts at the FFC receive 
on average about fifty to seventy-five intelligence products each month from outside 
sources to be analyzed, not including the reports they generate. The FFC has limited 
agriculture sector analysis capabilities and no agriculture sector SME assigned in the 
FFC. This is a gap in this capability.   
235. Ifft, “Florida’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Program,” 20. 
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FDACS is in a prime position to collect agriculture information and intelligence 
with its regulatory bureaus in the field such as DAI and DFS and its law enforcement 
branch OALE. However, despite the specific strategic goals concerning information 
exchange with the food and agriculture sector as outlined in the Domestic Security 
Strategic Plan, there is no known connection point between anyone in these FDACS 
regulatory bureaus and the fusion centers. The SART group also has no information 
exchange with the fusion centers. Some OALE law enforcement members are linked to 
the fusion centers, and OALE has an agency liaison linked with the FFC, however, 
OALE does not participate in the Interagency Fusion Liaison meetings. Finally, while the 
FFC is able to connect with agriculture subject matter experts via the OALE liaison, there 
is no agriculture sector SME assigned to the FFC conducting regular intelligence 
analysis. These are gaps in Florida’s information and intelligence gathering and sharing 
capabilities. 
Development of information and intelligence was an important theme found 
throughout the NIJ212280. The authors of the study are not alone in stressing this theme. 
From the literature review, authors Monke and Chalk both discuss the need for 
agriculture focused intelligence collection and sharing information between law 
enforcement and the intelligence community. Dr. David L. Carter is a long-time 
proponent of intelligence led policing and encourages individual law enforcement 
agencies to have a dedicated intelligence unit. Dr. Carter wrote in the FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin:  
Those without such units need to develop some type of intelligence 
capacity, even if it consists of only one person trained to understand the 
language, processes, and products available. This person can serve as the 
department’s intelligence contact point, as well as the conduit to 
disseminate information to those who need it.236 
 
236. David L. Carter, “The Law Enforcement Intelligence Function: State, Local, and Tribal Agencies,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin 74, no. 6 (June 2005): 1. 
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OALE does not have any agency criminal analytical or intelligence component and this is 
a tremendous gap in OALE’s ability as Florida’s preeminent agriculture law enforcement 
entity to defend the state’s agriculture. 
A primary focus of the information and intelligence sharing discussion has 
revolved around the fusion centers as Florida’s primary means for dissemination of 
information. However, there are criticisms of the fusion center concept. The 2008 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Fusion Centers:  Issues And 
Options For Congress, found that, “While many of the centers have prevention of attacks 
as a high priority, little “true fusion,” or analysis of disparate data sources, identification 
of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which 
could contribute to prevention is occurring.”237 The 2012 Senate Investigations 
Subcommittee findings, Federal Support For And Involvement With State And Local 
Fusion Centers, is a scathing report on the nation’s fusion centers. The report notes, “The 
Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers 
forwarded ‘intelligence’ of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely..”238 The 
report refers to a 2010 assessment that found, “widespread deficiencies in the centers’ 
basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities.”239  
Fortunately, the feedback on fusion centers is not all bad. The House report 
referred to previously, noted many strengths in the fusion centers, finding the network to 
be a valuable national asset.240 The 2008 CRS report stated, “The value proposition for 
fusion centers is that by integrating various streams of information and intelligence, 
including that flowing from the federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, 
237. John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, Washington, DC:  Congressional Research 
Service, 2008, Summary, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA482006. 
238. Carl Levin and Tom Coburn, Federal Support For And Involvement In State and Local Fusion Centers 
(Washington, DC: United States Senate. Permanent Subcomittee On Investigations, October 3, 2012), 1, 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/abstractdb/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=16220. 
239. Ibid., 2. 
240. Michael T. McCaul and Peter T. King, Majority Staff Report On The National Network Of Fusion Centers 




                                                 
as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks…can be developed and 
translated into protective action.”241  
The JTTFs and FACIU are two multiagency partnerships having a nexus with 
agroterrorism in the State of Florida. Florida is home to six JTTFs and OALE does not 
have a presence on any of them. These task forces focus on terrorism investigations, 
issues, threats, and suspects having a clear nexus to agroterrorism and very likely do not 
have any link to the agriculture community nor any agriculture subject matter expert 
member. The JTTFs are also conduits for the flow of terrorism related information and 
intelligence. The lack of OALE participation in the JTTF is a gap. 
Analysis of the FACIU found the organization to be a tremendous agriculture 
focused information and intelligence sharing asset to the state. The FACIU is comprised 
of agriculture unit deputies from most of the sheriffs offices located in the heavily 
agriculture producing counties in the state, all of the OALE sworn investigators, other 
state agencies such as FWC and FDLE, the FBI, USDA, FDACS, as well as private 
sector members from the agriculture industry. The FACIU is active in collecting and 
disseminating agriculture specific information and intelligence via its website and email 
distribution list, regular association meetings, and annual conferences.   
Before delving into analysis of the data collected on the FACIU it is important to 
note the limitations of the data. The amount of data available for analysis was very 
limited due to access restrictions to the FACIU website. Due to the website 
unavailability, the research was restricted to a little less than one year’s worth of emails, 
meeting minutes, and one annual conference. Review and analysis of emails, meeting 
minutes, and yearly conference agenda found no inclusion of agroterrorism as a topic or 
focus for the FACIU. agroterrorism as a topic may have been found, had access to more 
data been available. However, all indications from analyzing the FACIU leave little doubt 
that if any information concerning agroterrorism were to reach the organization they 
would push it out. The FACIU is highly engaged with their membership and highly 
active in sharing information specific to their mission, which is agriculture crime. The 
241. Rollins, Fusion Centers, Summary. 
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FACIU has not focused on the issue of agroterrorism because it has not been a topic of 
concern in their communities of interest. However, the FACIU could benefit from 
outreach and education on the topic of agroterrorism to broaden their field of vision into 
agriculture threats and enhance Florida’s defense network. 
4. Smuggled Food Interdiction 
NIJ212280 recommended the SFIT concept with combined food regulatory and 
law enforcement personnel working in teams to seek out illegal food products. This 
model does not exist in Florida, but that does not necessarily mean that a gap exists. The 
reasoning behind the NIJ report concept is valid. Illegal food products are a threat not 
only to unknowing consumers, but also to the agriculture industry. This is one of the 
lessons learned from the UK experience with FMD. Illegally imported meat products 
contaminated with the FMD virus and used in animal feed fed to swine caused the 2001 
FMD outbreak in Great Britain, one of the largest and costliest in world history.242   
In Florida, food safety regulation and inspection functions are conducted by DFS 
civilian inspectors, who are assisted as needed by sworn OALE personnel. OALE 
Interdiction Stations provide the first layer of protection. What the State of Kansas may 
have lacked in capability, requiring the creation of the SFIT concept from the NIJ report, 
was the large food safety regulation system with sworn law enforcement support, as 
provided by the FDACS in Florida. The statistical data and law enforcement reports 
found and examined in the Florida assessment section indicate the existing strategy in 
place achieves and exceeds the desired capability as outlined in NIJ212280 with the SFIT 
team’s recommendation. There is no gap found in this capability for Florida. 
 
 
242. Iain Anderson, Foot and Mouth Disease 2001:  Lessons to Be Learned Inquiry Report (London: House of 
Commons, July 22, 2002), http://www.epcollege.com/EPC/media/MediaLibrary/Knowledge%20Hub%20Documents/
F%20Inquiry%20Reports/Anderson-FMD-Review_Part1.pdf?ext=.pdf. 
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B. GAPS IN RESPONSE-RELATED ACTIVITIES 
Law enforcement’s agroterrorism response responsibilities, as specified in 
NIJ212280, included implementing response plans and NIMS, crime scene and evidence 
management, enforcement of quarantines and stop movement orders, criminal 
investigation, and conflict resolution. Components that were evaluated in Florida with 
potential response responsibilities included FDACS, DAI, DFS, SART, and OALE. 
Aspects that were examined included agency responsibilities, statutory authorities, 
response and operating plans, associated response and operating plans, as well as 
historical response experiences and data. 
1. Foreign Animal Disease Response 
If all prevention efforts fail and an FAD outbreak occurs, there will be a response 
to contain and eradicate the disease spread, as well as investigate any criminality 
involved. NIJ212280 recommended deployment of a Rapid Response Team comprised of 
animal health and law enforcement officials in order to address the animal health and 
outbreak elements, as well as manage crime scene, evidence, and criminal investigation if 
needed. Florida State Statutes amply address FDACS and DAI roles, responsibilities and 
direct authority over an animal disease event. Statutory authorities are also established 
and clear, covering OALE’s role in providing law enforcement support to any FDACS 
responsibility or action. The FAD-ERP plan is a comprehensive FDACS plan for 
responding to agriculture disaster events. Florida has well-tested and proven protocols for 
standing up resources in the event of any declared state emergency, and for implementing 
plans and deploying specialty teams to most types of emergency events, including 
agriculture related disasters. NIMS and ICS protocols are included in every plan.   
The FAD-ERP plan did not refer specifically to agroterrorism events, however 
this is not necessarily a gap. As found and noted in the literature review, agriculture 
disease outbreak and disaster scenarios tend to replicate naturally occurring events of the 
same type. This is because the diseases used as weapons in an agroterror attack are the 
same as those diseases that cause natural disasters. From the animal health aspect, the 
response to an animal disease outbreak is the same whether it is natural or intentional. 
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The difference between a natural or intentional event is the criminal investigation 
element. The problem is the point at which the outbreak is found to have been 
intentionally initiated, whether by an admission or by evidence found, and law 
enforcement then beginning a criminal investigation. This could occur weeks, months, or 
years after the event. 
There are many real world examples of disasters and outbreaks from the food and 
agriculture sector in which a criminal investigation came into play long after the initial 
response. The only proven Bioterror attack perpetrated on U.S. soil was the Rajneeshee 
cult poisoning of restaurant salad bars with salmonella in Oregon in 1984. The purpose of 
the attacks was to aid the cult in taking over the county government in the elections at 
that time, making the attack an act of terrorism. The poisonings were not attributed to the 
Rajneeshees, and there was no criminal investigation until well over a year later, when 
internal conflicts in the cult led to the outing of certain members involved.243   
In the 1980s a preferred method for controlling crop pests was spraying the 
pesticide malathion, which was a practice of some public debate and consternation at the 
time.244  In March of 1989, a large Mediterranean fruit fly (MedFly) outbreak was 
discovered in California’s crop fields, posing a significant threat to the state’s $40 billion 
agriculture industry. Nine months later, a group calling themselves The Breeders posted a 
letter claiming responsibility for intentionally releasing the MedFly with the goal of 
creating an infestation so unmanageable that the state would cease their pesticide 
spraying efforts. At this time, the FBI began investigating The Breeders and the MedFly 
outbreaks, although no members of the group or evidence was ever found.245 
Other examples include the 1995 Taiwan FMD outbreak, Florida’s battle with 
citrus canker, and the 1999 West Nile virus outbreak in New York. The Taiwan outbreak 
was thought by some to be an intentional act of terrorism perpetrated by China, though 
243. Les Zaltz, “25 Years after Rajneeshee Commune Collapsed, Truth Spills out — Part 1 of 5,” The Oregonian, 
April 14, 2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/rajneesh/index.ssf/2011/04/part_one_it_was_worse_than_we.html. 
244. Clyde Haberman, “The Battle Over the Medfly,” The New York Times, March 16, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/us/the-battle-over-the-medfly.html. 
245. Ashley Dunn, “Officials Advertise to Contact Mystery Group Claiming Medfly Releases,” Los Angeles 
Times, February 10, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-02-10/local/me-169_1_mysterious-group. 
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this was never proven.246  Florida has combatted canker disease outbreaks in the citrus 
crop off and on for over one hundred years, including a new outbreak beginning in 1995. 
In 1996, the CIA began investigating a claim that the new canker outbreak was an 
intentional attack from Fidel Castro’s Cuban bioweapons program.247 An article search 
for “1999 West Nile terrorist attack” finds multiple references for what many considered 
a bioterrorism attack on New York City. No evidence was found and perhaps no 
investigation was even conducted. What these examples illustrate is the need for a 
criminal investigative component from the outset of a response to any large-scale food 
and agriculture sector related outbreak. The evidence or information that an outbreak was 
a criminal or terrorist act could come long after the response, if it comes to light at all. 
These examples and this weak link in the typical response to an agriculture or 
animal disease outbreak are why the NIJ212280 recommended the establishment of 
RRT’s with combined animal health and law enforcement investigator members. The 
report authors recognized that it is neither the role nor the responsibility of the animal 
health responders to be concerned with rules of crime scenes and evidence collection, 
preservation, and chain of custody rules. They also recognized animal health 
professionals are not trained in criminal investigations to ask the specific questions to 
potential witnesses that may reveal suspicious activities, nor to recognize evidence of 
such activities. The role of the sworn investigator on the RRT is to be alert to indications 
of criminal activity and mindful of crime scene and evidence requirements, while the 
animal health experts are focused on their roles. The NIJ study authors were not alone in 
seeing the need for animal disease event investigations. From the literature review, Chalk 
urged for a focus of attention on law enforcement and forensic investigations for 
determining whether disease outbreaks were deliberate or naturally occurring. The FAD-
ERP for animal disease incidents does not include reference to law enforcement other 
than for use in guarding facilities and enforcing quarantine zones. This is a gap in the 
FAD-ERP and FDACS response protocols.  
246. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism. 
247. Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism:  Specific Recommendations for the United States 
Department of Agriculture.” 
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2. Quarantine Enforcement 
The ability to establish and enforce quarantines and stop movement orders is 
stressed in NIJ212280, and with good reason. Effective quarantine enforcement is one of 
the lessons learned from the British experience with FMD. Great Britain offers a unique 
opportunity for comparison with Florida due to both the similarity of government policies 
as well as geography. Florida is a peninsula state bordered mostly by water, though 
abutting two other states, Georgia with its northern land border and Alabama with its 
northwest land border. In size, Florida is 58,560 square miles, 447 miles long, spans 361 
miles at its widest points, and has 1,197 miles of coastline.248  England is the largest 
country in Great Britain, which is the largest of the islands comprising the United 
Kingdom. As part of an island, England is primarily bordered by water, however Wales 
borders to the west and Scotland to the north. England is 50,337 square miles, 622 miles 
long, spans 311 miles at its widest points, and has 4,920 miles of coastline.249   
Prior to 2001, the United Kingdom’s FMD policy did not exist. Then, in 2001 the 
United Kingdom was hit, unprepared, with a FMD outbreak. On February 19th, 
veterinarians were alerted to the first signs of sick animals. Over eight months later, 6.2 
million animals had been destroyed at a cost of $8 billion pounds.250  Other estimates of 
the total final costs range from $6 billion to $20 billion. Figure 7 depicts FMD infected 
premises in Great Britain subsequent to this outbreak (as taken from the Royal 
Geographic Society).   
 
248. “Facts About Florida,” State of Florida, accessed August 17, 2014, http://www.stateofflorida.com/Portal/
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=95. 
249. “United Kingdom Country Overview Location and Size,” Encyclopedia of Nations, accessed August 17, 
2014, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/United-Kingdom.html. 
250. Anderson, Foot and Mouth Disease 2001:  Lessons to Be Learned Inquiry Report. 
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Figure 7. Total Infected Premises251 
Scientific journal review papers The UK foot-and-mouth disease outbreak – the 
aftermath252 and Foot-and-mouth disease in the UK:  What should we do next time?253 
both analyzed the response to the 2001 event and agreed on several lessons learned. One 
of these lessons was that rapid and decisive intervention at the onset of an outbreak was 
imperative, including immediate nationwide stoppages on movement of animals. The 
251. “Jessica Sellick Answers Questions on Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and the Impact of the Recession in 
the Countryside,” Royal Geographical Society, 2010, http://www.rgs.org/OurWork/Schools/Geography+in+the+News/
Ask+the+experts/Foot+and+Mouth+Disease+%28FMD%29.htm. 
252. Daniel T Haydon, Rowland R Kao, and R. Paul Kitching, “The UK Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak — the 
Aftermath,” Nature Reviews Microbiology 2 (August 2004): 675–81. 
253. MEJ Woolhouse, “Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the UK:  What Should We Do Next Time?,” The Society for 
Applied MIcrobiology, Journal of Applied Microbiology, no. 94 (2003): 126S – 130S. 
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official UK government review of the 2001 outbreak, Foot and Mouth Disease 2001:  
Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report, was prepared by Dr. Iain Anderson and presented 
to the House of Commons July 22, 2002.254  Part of Dr. Anderson’s many criticisms 
included lack of disease control policy and very slow and uncoordinated initial response. 
It was three weeks before a movement stoppage order on animals was put into effect. 
Figure 8 depicts how the disease spread across Great Britain in two weeks with no 









Figure 8. 2001 FMD Outbreak Spread256 
Six years later, the UK was hit with the opportunity to test their lessons learned, 
but this time the UK was armed with a comprehensive FMD response strategy, which is 
very similar to the U.S. strategy, as found in the USDA’s Red Book.257  On August 2, 
254. Anderson, Foot and Mouth Disease 2001:  Lessons to Be Learned Inquiry Report. 
255. “Foot-and-Mouth: The Key Stats,” BBC, February 18, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1334466.stm. 
256. Ibid. 
257. United States Department of Agriculture, Foot and Mouth Disease Response Ready Reference Guide - 
Comparing U.S. and U.K. FMD Response Planning (Washington, DC, August 2013), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/fmd_rrg_usuk_plan.pdf. 
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2007, a veterinarian was notified of some sick animals at a farm. By the end of the next 
day, August 3rd, test samples had confirmed FMD, animal movement bans had been 
enacted, and protection quarantine zones had been established around the outbreak area. 
Culling of animals began the next day, and vaccination protocols were ready to be 
implemented five days later. The 2007 outbreak lasted half the length of the 2001 event 
with only about 2,000 animals destroyed and at a cost of approximately $200 million.258   
Fortunately, Florida’s geography and the positioning of OALE interdiction 
stations provide the state with a unique advantage for effectively closing off entry or exit 
of agriculture products or animals. Additionally, FDACS and OALE have extensive 
experience and capabilities in quarantine enforcement. Figure 9 (as taken from the USDA 
FMD Response Guide) depicts bovine concentrations in the State of Florida. Clearly, the 
greatest concentrations fall well below the line of interdiction stations where animal 
movements would pass through. The densest concentrations of livestock are the likeliest 
outbreak points for an FAD event. 
 
 
Figure 9. Bovine Population by County259 
258. Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. Food and Forestry, At What Cost?  2001 and 2001 Foot and Mouth 
Disease Outbreak United Kingdom, accessed May 15, 2014, http://www.oda.state.ok.us/ais/atwhatcost.pdf. 
259. United States Department of Agriculture, FMD Response - Understanding Response Strategies, 3. 
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Based on the findings of the Florida Assessment, in the event of most any FAD 
outbreak scenarios, the OALE interdiction stations would very likely be able to 
effectively seal off the state to enforce the resulting statewide quarantines and stop 
movement orders and prevent any susceptible species from leaving. Local enforcement of 
Infected Zone quarantines could become a more complicated issue, as would the case of 
an outbreak in the panhandle beyond the security of the interdiction station network. 
However, even in this type of scenario, FDACS and OALE have extensive history in 
effectively enforcing local and regional quarantines. No gap exists in this capability.  
3. Case Study:  Ocala HITS Show 
In addition to analyzing policies and plans, the evaluation of actual response 
events can provide invaluable insight to the efficacy of these documents. Florida’s most 
recent livestock disease outbreak occurred in the winter of 2013 at the Horse Shows in 
the Sun (HITS) in Ocala. The HITS winter circuit runs for nine weeks and attract 3,500 
horses, 7,500 participants, and 10,000 spectators each year. On February 21, 2013, 
FDACS DAI was notified that a horse in the show was exhibiting clinical neurological 
signs.260  The horse later tested positive for Equine Herpes Virus Type 1 (EHV-1), which 
is a common infection in horses than can cause abortion, respiratory and neurological 
disease. Air, contaminated articles and clothing, and hands spread EHV-1.261   
EHV-1 is not an FAD and is endemic in the U.S. and thus is treated as a state 
issue, with USDA not becoming involved unless the disease spreads across state lines. 
This is an important distinction to understanding the analysis of this event in the correct 
context. EHV-1 is not included in the diseases commonly associated with a potential 
agroterrorism event, such as FMD. The potential consequences of EHV-1 do reach the 
level of an FAD and the level of response is comparatively lower as well. However, this 
was the most relevent animal disease outbreak available with the closest similarities to an 
260. Greg Christy, Ocala EHV-1 Incident After Action Report, After Action (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Department 
of Agriculture and Consumer Services, May 20, 2013). 





                                                 
FAD event for evaluation and some key findings resulted, which contributed value to the 
thesis.  
FDACS DAI responded to the HITS show and activated an IMT on February 28 
initiating testing and quarantine protocols. Fifteen premises and over 1,000 horses around 
the state were quarantined for twenty-one days due to the outbreak. This event was also 
considered a SART group response, as SART team members were included from the DAI 
agency response and the SART IMT was used. In the After Action Report comments 
section, it was noted that the gates to the show grounds had to be manned 24-hours per 
day in order to enforce the quarantines. For the first two days of the outbreak. the gates 
were manned by show employees who proved to be unreliable often leaving the gates 
unattended. Due to these lapses, FDACS personnel were then used to man the gates and 
OALE sworn personnel were called in to assist.262   
The Ocala EHV-1 outbreak is a case study on how difficult animal containment 
can be in even a much smaller incident than the FMD outbreaks in the UK. The Ocala 
Star Banner reported an “exodus” of owners removing hundreds of horses from the HITS 
show after the first horse was found infected, but prior to the quarantine being 
established.263 Some associated with the horse show expressed outrage over the state 
enacted quarantine. Again, EHV-1 is not an FAD and the proper protocols were followed 
in the response to this type of outbreak and in the timeframes for establishing the 
quarantines. However, this event serves as an example for the challenges in establishing 
and enforcing quarantines. Quarantines can be very unpopular and an uphill battle to 
enforce. No one wants to be caught inside the zone. 
Analysis of the EHV-1 After Action Report reveals two key findings. The first is 
that the FDACS DAI has effective animal disease reporting and response protocols in 
place. The disease was quickly reported and a response was rapidly initiated to include 
standing up an IC and implementing quarantines. Although EHV-1 is not a FAD, review 
of the incident indicates response was handled in accordance with the Foreign Animal 
262. Christy, Ocala EHV-1 Incident After Action Report. 
263. Carlos Medina, “Equine Herpes Virus Impacts HITS Show,” Ocala Star Banner, February 28, 2013, 
http://www.ocala.com/article/20130228/articles/130229645. 
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Disease Response Plan. The outbreak was effectively contained and resolved. The second 
key finding is the gap that existed by not having a law enforcement component with the 
response team from the beginning. No investigation into the outbreak by law 
enforcement, as recommended in NIJ212280, was noted in the EHV-1 AAR. Use of law 
enforcement in this exact scenario is identified in the FAD-ERP, however, law 
enforcement was not included with the initial response team and was requested to 
respond after issues with quarantine enforcement was identified. The quarantine 
enforcement issues that were experienced were not due to a gap in capabilities, but 
instead were due to a gap in strategy and policy, i.e., no law enforcement component 
intrinsic to the initial response.   
4. Law Enforcement Role Ambiguity 
Research and analysis into Florida’s response capabilities revealed an issue 
outside the specific context of the seven Florida assessment questions. A consistent gap 
found in the response analysis has been a lack of specified law enforcement components 
integrated into response efforts and planning. However, the law enforcement components 
are available and have the authorities to participate and integrate into these roles. A 
potential issue with the law enforcement roles exists involving agency responsibilities 
overlapping in an agroterrorism event. Pursuant to FSS 570.073, OALE is designated 
having primary responsibility over agriculture related law enforcement and having 
jurisdiction over laws pertaining to the security and safety of Florida’s agriculture. It is 
reasonable to conclude this jurisdiction would apply to an agroterrorism attack as such an 
event is agriculture related and involves the security and safety of the industry. However, 
FDLE has been designated as the lead state agency in all terrorism related issues in 
Florida by state statute as found in FSS 943.03(14): 
The department, with respect to counter-terrorism efforts, responses to 
acts of terrorism within or affecting this state, and other matters related to 
the domestic security of Florida as it relates to terrorism, shall coordinate 
and direct the law enforcement, initial emergency, and other initial 
responses. The department shall work closely with the Division of 
Emergency Management, other federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies, fire and rescue agencies, first-responder agencies, and others 
involved in preparation against acts of terrorism in or affecting this state 
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and in the response to such acts. The executive director of the department, 
or another member of the department designated by the director, shall 
serve as Chief of Domestic Security for the purpose of directing and 
coordinating such efforts. The department and Chief of Domestic Security 
shall use the regional domestic security task forces as established in this 
chapter to assist in such efforts.264 
FDLE’s lead role designation in terrorism is also noted in many other documents such as 
the state CEMP and the FERP Annex. This potential issue with two law enforcement 
agencies with the same roles and responsibilities in the same situation is not a gap so 
much as it is a point of ambiguity. Whether defined as a “gap” or an “oversight,” it 
should be addressed. Even minor points of ambiguity can become major stressors if left 
unaddressed until the onset of a large-scale disaster. 
Research into law enforcement’s statutory responsibilities led into another 
potential point of ambiguity concerning Florida’s statutory definition of “terrorism.”  Per 
FSS 775.30 Terrorism; defined: 
 (1)(a) Involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life which is 
a violation of the criminal laws of this state or of the United States; or 
(b) Involves a violation of s. 815.06; and 
(2) Is intended to: 
(a) Intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population; 
(b) Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(c) Affect the conduct of government through destruction of property, 
assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.265 
Many, if not most, potential acts of agroterrorism do not involve a violent act or an act 
dangerous to human life, so Florida’s Terrorism statute would not apply. Florida does not 
have a specific statute for agroterrorism. This is not necessarily a gap as any act of 
terrorism or agroterrorism is at its root a crime, so the lack of a specific statute would not 
264. “Department of Law Enforcement,” F.S.S. Ch. 943.03, accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.leg.state.fl.us/
Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0943/SEC03.HTM&Title=-%3E2009-
%3ECh0943-%3ESection%2003#0943.03. 
265. “Terrorism,” F.S.S. Ch. 775.30, 2001, http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/Chapter775/All. 
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preclude the appropriate preparations and response to such an event. Also, in any event 
that is found to be a terrorist act, the FBI will ultimately respond and assume the lead in 
the investigation regardless of state laws or definitions. 
C. GAPS IN TRAINING 
Training is an aspect that straddles both categories of prevention and response and 
thus was addressed as a separate category. agroterrorism training was not found to be a 
component of the Florida Basic Recruit Training Program attended by all sworn law 
enforcement personnel in the state, nor the CJSTC advanced training options. The FEMA 
National Preparedness Directorate offered courses related to agroterrorism on topics such 
as Terrorism and Animals in Disaster, however, no agroterrorism specific training. The 
FEMA certified WIFFS courses were the only agroterrorism training found available to 
Florida personnel. 
The lack of agroterrorism training for basic police academy recruits or CJSTC 
advanced options does not represent a gap. The purpose of the police academy is to 
prepare the entry-level law enforcement officer for general policing duties. The CJSTC 
advanced offerings includes a limited selection of forty-five courses aimed at offering the 
most needed advanced trainings needed by the widest range of agencies. agroterrorism is 
a niche topic, and the training is useful to a niche audience within the law enforcement 
profession.  
The WIFFS courses outlined in the Florida Assessment are the best available 
agroterrorism courses available for law enforcement at this time, and analysis of the 
content of these courses finds they are adequate to the task. AWR151 Understanding the 
Dangers of Agroterrorism, AWR152 Principles of Preparedness for Agroterrorism and 
Food Systems Disasters, AWR153 Principles of Detection and Diagnosis, AWR154 
Principles of National Incident Management System, AWR155 Principles of Frontline 
Response to Agroterrorism, and AWR156 Principles of Planning and Implementing 
Recover.   
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According to the FDLE Criminal Justice Profile Report 2010 there are 
approximately 42,000 sworn law enforcement officers in the State of Florida.266  Of this 
number, 17,536 are police officers in local jurisdictions, 1,048 serve in schools and ports, 
19,229 are sheriff’s deputies, and 4,098 are state agency officers. These numbers do not 
include analysts, clerks, or intelligence positions in agencies that are not sworn 
positions.267  Not every law enforcement officer needs this training. However, the data 
revealed comparatively low numbers have received any of the AWR trainings.   
Only a total of 183 Florida law enforcement officers out of a total of 42,000 have 
attended an AWR class. Only seventy-six sheriff’s deputies, representing nineteen of the 
sixty-seven county sheriff’s offices have attended an AWR class. Forty-nine of the nearly 
250 OALE sworn members have attended an AWR class. The largest state law 
enforcement entity, the Florida Highway Patrol, was not represented at all on the AWR 
class rolls. These numbers represent gaps in Florida law enforcement’s receipt of 
agroterrorism training. Any OALE sworn member could be dispatched to an 
agroterrorism event. Sheriff’s offices would be the primary law enforcement responders 
to an event in their respective county of jurisdiction. The highway patrol could be pressed 
into service for quarantine enforcements in the event of a large-scale outbreak. 
Other training issues include IC position training for specialty teams such as 
SART, and specialty training for agriculture SME intelligence analysts. The Ocala EHV-
1 after-action-report referred to needing specific IC role training for those in the IMT. 
This training is widely available all over Florida every year and is readily accessible. It is 
just a matter of identifying the who, the where, and the when and getting it done. In the 
Prevention Gaps section, the need for agriculture SME intelligence analyst was 
discussed. This position would require specific training. FDLE offers both a 40-hour 
Basic Analyst Training Course and an advanced six-week Florida Law Enforcement 
266. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Profile Report 2010, Tallahassee, FL, accessed 




                                                 
Analyst Academy.268  This is a nationally recognized program and is mentioned in the 
NIJ212280. Other FEMA courses would be applicable for this agriculture SME such as 
those agriculture related courses discussed previously and courses such as PER-259 
Implementation of Effective Sharing of Information and Intelligence Related to the 
Importation and Transportation of Food.269  
 
268. “Florida Law Enforcement Analyst Program,” Florida Department of Law Enforcement, accessed August 21, 
2014, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/content/getdoc/586c5070-fac8-44a2-8e53-661bef41b425/Analyst-Home.aspx. 
269. “Implementation of Effective Sharing of Information and Intelligence Related to the Importation and 
Transportation of Food,” University of Tennessee.C enter for Agriculture and Food Security and Preparedness. 
accessed August 21, 2014, http://www.vet.utk.edu/cafsp/courses/per259.php. 
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VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, little thought had been given 
to the concept of defending agriculture. The term agroterrorism had not even been used 
until about 2000. The first planning for a national strategy on agriculture defense began 
to appear in 2002. Still, there had been little discussion on law enforcement’s role in 
defending agriculture. NIJ212280 was the first major academic study of its kind in 
analyzing this role. As of this writing, NIJ212280 continues to stand as the only study of 
its kind serving as a framework for law enforcement’s role in defending agriculture and 
agroterrorism.   
Findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the NIJ212280 study having 
potential applicability to Florida were used to develop a series of questions designed to 
analyze Florida law enforcement’s capacity to accomplish their roles and responsibilities 
in the prevention and response to agroterrorism. The following questions were asked: 
• Is there a strategy for identifying threats to, and assessing the vulnerability
of, the agriculture community in Florida?
• Does the capacity exist in Florida to effectively collect, analyze, and
disseminate agriculture related information and intelligence?
• Is there a community policing strategy in the Florida agriculture
community?  NIJ212280 recommends the Agro-Guard model.
• Does Florida engage in the interdiction of illegally imported and possibly
contaminated food products?  NIJ212280 recommends establishment of a
SFIT.
• In the event of an FAD event response, does the capacity exist to
simultaneously handle the animal health related issues, as well as manage
crime scene and evidentiary requirements and conduct a criminal
investigation, if required. NIJ212280 recommends establishment of a
RRT.
• Does Florida law enforcement possess the capacity to enforce quarantines 
and stop movement plans in the event of an FAD event?
• Are agroterrorism trainings available and/or being delivered to Florida law
enforcement?
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The first four bulleted items fall under the heading of Prevention Capabilities. The next 
two fall under Response Capabilities. The final bullet, training issues, crosses both 
capabilities and is addressed within each category.  
With these capabilities questions identified, the Florida assessment was conducted 
to establish the current level of capabilities in these areas. Next, a gaps analysis was 
conducted by evaluating Florida’s existing capabilities against the questions in the 
context of the findings and recommendations from the NIJ212280. This final chapter 
discusses findings and conclusions resulting from the research and analysis and a 
multigoal analytical approach was used to develop recommendations for Florida. Criteria 
used to develop recommendations included cost, political ramifications or level of 
political acceptability required, legal and policy issues, and the anticipated effectiveness 
of the recommendation. In every case possible, existing frameworks and capabilities were 
recommended for enhancements as opposed to creation of new programs in the interest of 
cost effectiveness and political acceptability. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Prevention Capabilities
The research into the Florida assessment found areas in which solid prevention 
efforts have been taken, such as contaminated food interdiction. In fact, the research 
found that the existing food interdiction system in place now in Florida achieves the 
desired goals as outlined in NIJ212280 requiring no enhancement. However, there were 
also areas found with significant gaps, such as information and intelligence, threat and 
vulnerability assessments and agriculture community policing.   
One of the findings of NIJ212280 was that development and sharing of 
agriculture related intelligence was practically non-existent. This finding has been found 
true as well in Florida’s agriculture information and intelligence capabilities. There 
appears to be little exchange and analysis of information with the food and agriculture 
sector. Significant gaps in this capability exist, including limited agriculture industry 
subject matter expertise capability at the FFC, little or no information exchange between 
the FFC and FDACS regulatory personnel, lack of analytical and intelligence component 
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within OALE, lack of OALE participation in the JTTF, and lack of agroterrorism focus 
within the FACIU. 
OALE is Florida’s lead law enforcement agency for agriculture matters and 
should assume responsibility for building an agriculture focused intelligence capability in 
Florida. Unfortunately, this could cost some money and thus, could be a little painful. 
However, OALE should create and fund a dedicated agency intelligence and criminal 
analysis unit (I&A), complete with assigned analyst and investigator positions. The 
analysts do not have to be hired on as experts on analysis, terrorism, or law enforcement. 
These are trainable skills. The analysts do have to be subject matter experts on the food 
and agriculture sector. An SME analyst should be assigned to the FFC to review all 
intelligence exchanges from the perspective of an agriculture sector expert.   
The I&A unit would interface with the FACIU, FDACS regulatory and non-sworn 
division personnel, and engage in industry and community outreach. The FACIU was 
found to be a tremendous asset in the collection and sharing of agriculture crime 
information with an established membership of law enforcement focused on agriculture. 
An OALE intelligence analyst should be highly engaged with the FACIU in both sharing 
and distributing information and in attending meetings. This would keep the channels of 
information open as well as provide the opportunity to input a focus on agroterrorism 
issues into the FACIU. Engaging with the non-sworn entities of the FDACS regulatory 
divisions, who have constant interaction with the agriculture community, could provide a 
wealth of information on what is going on in the sector. Additionally, OALE should 
assign an investigator from the agency intelligence unit to one of the JTTFs. The JTTF is 
the lead mechanism for participating in terrorism related investigations and receiving 
info. There should be agroterrorism perspective represented on the task force. 
There are many training classes and programs already, as outlined in the 
assessment chapter, available in Florida that would be valuable for members of a new 
agriculture focused I&A unit. The agroterrorism AWR training courses, the agriculture 
related FEMA courses, and agriculture related intelligence courses such as PER-259. The 
FDLE Law Enforcement Analyst Academy should be mandatory as well for all new 
analysts. 
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Granted, this proposal is not an easy solution, requiring creating a new program 
within OALE that does not now exist and funding new positions. However, in doing so, 
OALE would create conduits of information exchange and analysis capabilities that do 
not now exist in the State of Florida. New expenditures could potentially be mitigated, if 
not eliminated with the correct strategy. FDACS is a large agency and there is a 
possibility positions could be identified for reclassification in lieu of approaching the 
legislature for new appropriations. If a handful of positions could be identified for 
reclassification, an I&A unit could be created with no new costs.   
By using existing infrastructure such as the FFC, it leverages current capabilities 
and limits new spending and the need for new programs. Fusion center criticisms were 
discussed previously, however, if the fusion center is not the ideal venue for facilitating 
the flow and analysis of agriculture information and intelligence, then the question is 
“where would that place be”?  In reality, there may be no perfect solution to information 
sharing. The fact is the fusion center network is Florida’s choice for intelligence and 
information sharing. A gap exists in Florida in facilitating the receipt of, analysis of, and 
dissemination of agriculture intelligence and information, and the fusion center is the 
appropriate venue for addressing the deficiency. A food and agriculture SME provided 
through an OALE I&A unit could greatly enhance that “value proposition” described in 
the CRS report for the Florida Fusion Center. 
Standing up an intelligence unit within OALE and providing an agriculture SME 
analyst in the FFC feeds directly into the next prevention item community policing. 
Florida does not have an agriculture community policing capability as described in 
NIJ212280. However, the mechanisms or vehicles are already in place that could be 
enhanced to achieve this capability. These existing mechanisms are the SART group and 
the FACIU.   
As a MAC group partnered with agriculture responders and producers and 
focused on agriculture planning, prevention, biosecurity, awareness and protective 
actions in the agricultural community, SART is highly engaged with the industry and 
community. SART already exists as a partnership between FDACS and animal health 
through VetCore, the industry through dozens of group partnerships, and the community 
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with thousands of affiliated volunteers. SART offers an excellent vehicle for creating an 
agriculture community policing effort, needing only the addition of law enforcement 
members to create the desired interaction as described in NIJ212280. 
Sheriffs are highly important members of the law enforcement community in 
Florida and tend to have close ties with their communities. Many Sheriff’s Offices have 
dedicated agriculture crimes units or deputies. Many of these participate in the FACIU, 
which offers another excellent vehicle for creating an agriculture community policing 
effort. The FACIU is comprised of the law enforcement members that SART lacks, yet 
lacks the industry and community outreach that SART excels at. OALE is already active 
in the FACIU with all OALE investigators on the membership role. SART is also 
familiar to the FACIU, having participated in FACIU annual conferences providing 
training.   
There is no need to reinvent the wheel or create a new program from scratch in 
order to achieve the capabilities recommended by NIJ212280. The gaps analysis found 
many of the aspects found in SART and the FACIU mirror the goals for the AgroGuard 
program as outlined in the NIJ study. The primary pieces missing were found to be the 
lack of a focused effort under the banner of “agriculture community policing” and lack of 
a direct information gateway with the public. The lack of a focused and designed 
agriculture community policing program is not necessarily a gap if the capability is being 
achieved, i.e., if the outreach and engagement between law enforcement and the 
agriculture community is occurring and information is being exchanged then the goal is 
being met even if it not called an “AgroGuard” program. Between the efforts of SART 
and the FACIU the outreach and engagement is occurring. What is missing is the 
information loop between the community and law enforcement. 
What is needed is to combine the existing capabilities and infrastructure provided 
by SART, the FACIU and OALE and hopefully incorporate the new capabilities brought 
about with creation of an OALE intelligence unit and increased agricultural focus in the 
FFC. Instead of creating an AgroGuard program to promote the sharing of information 
between law enforcement and the agriculture community the existing mechanisms of 
SART and the FACIU can be used to promote this concept as a part of their normal, daily 
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interactions. To support this effort, signs could be made and placed in the community, 
similar to the AgroGuard signs from the NIJ212280, with contact numbers to call the 
FACIU or the OALE I&A unit to report suspicious activity in the agriculture community. 
This enhancement would create those avenues of engagement and channels of 
communication sought by the authors of the NIJ212280 and would meet the 
recommended capability. 
Both the agriculture community-policing concept and the intelligence and 
information sharing components play into the final prevention item, threat and 
vulnerability assessments. Florida has a robust state strategy in place for protection of 
critical infrastructure, and the food and agriculture sector, as well as having the 
infrastructure in place for addressing this strategy with the regional Critical Infrastructure 
Planners. The gap in this capability, despite the state strategy, has been the presumed lack 
of focus on the agriculture sector. This dynamic is not only found in the critical 
infrastructure realm and is not isolated to Florida. As found in the literature review, the 
food and agriculture sector tend to receive comparatively less attention than most other 
areas in the homeland security sphere. With the strategy and framework largely in place 
already, all that is needed is to supply the focus and direction.  
The creation of an OALE I&A unit would play a key role in supplying this focus 
and direction. The I&A would facilitate the channeling and analysis of threat information 
from the agriculture community and industry, SART, and the FACIU to provide the CI 
planners with direction on emerging threats in the food and agriculture sector. The CI 
planners need education and training on the agriculture sector and its associated risks and 
threats. This training is available. The agriculture industry and community needs 
education on the risks of agroterrorism and the benefits available from threat and 
vulnerability assessments. Members of the agriculture industry are largely buffered from 
the homeland security world, which likely contributes to the comparative lack of 
attention paid to the sector. Engagement between the sector and law enforcement would 
increase the benefits to both parties. Interaction and information exchange between the 
FACIU, SART, OALE I&A and CI would increase the focus on threats to agriculture and 
set Florida on the road to meeting the capability recommended in NIJ212280. 
 92 
While these prevention issue gaps have been discussed and addressed as three 
separate topics, they are really interwoven and interdependent. In the final analysis, they 
are all about the exchange and flow of agriculture specific information and intelligence. 
In Florida, there are currently very few channels of agriculture information flow. The 
NIJ212280, as well as selections from the literature review, stressed the need for this flow 
of agriculture-specific information from and to the agriculture community and industry, 
law enforcement, and the intelligence apparatus. The creation of an agriculture focused 
intelligence unit staffed with true sector subject matter expert analysts could facilitate the 
engagement and exchange of information with the industry and community, non-sworn 
government employees in the sector, OALE, the FACIU, SART, and the RDSTFs and 
critical infrastructure program. 
2.  Response Capabilities 
As the research progressed, it became apparent that Florida’s strengths in existing 
capabilities for an agroterrorism event lay in response. In retrospect, this is no surprise as 
Florida is heavily invested in response in general. Florida is no stranger to emergency 
response, often being the target for significant natural disasters such as major hurricanes. 
Over decades of these large-scale events, Florida has honed its emergency response 
capabilities with heavy investment in pre-event planning, emergency management 
infrastructure and capabilities, and stored and staged resources. The research found this to 
be the case as well for agriculture related response capabilities. The response related 
capabilities to be met included the capacity to respond to an FAD event and 
simultaneously handle the animal health related issues, as well as manage crime scene, 
evidentiary requirements, and conduction of criminal investigation, and quarantine 
enforcement capabilities.   
Florida already has much of the response recommendations from NIJ212280 
working and in place. Extensive response plans and capabilities exist for an FAD event or 
other agriculture or animal disease outbreak within FDACS, DAI, SART, and the FAD-
ERP. The element that is missing from Florida’s capabilities is having a law enforcement 
component intrinsic to their response as is outlined in the RRT concept in NIJ212280. 
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Florida has a large and capable agriculture focused law enforcement element within 
FDACS in their OALE division. As noted in the Gaps Analysis chapter, the gap is not 
with capability it is with policy and strategy. With effective response plans and statutory 
authorities already in place, these gaps are easily rectified. 
The FAD-ERP, as well as any protocols or plans for responding to an animal 
disease event that is not an FAD such as the EHV-1 event, should be amended for 
inclusion of an OALE investigative unit with any DAI animal disease response team to 
address these gaps. The FAD-ERP section on quarantines should also include an OALE 
uniform bureau unit response to facilitate the immediate enforcement of quarantines, 
which will surely be required in even a small FMD outbreak. OALE has a proven history 
for enforcing quarantines and stop movements at the state borders with their line of 
interdiction stations, and can easily enforce these orders at the state border. However, the 
research, especially the findings of the British experience with FMD, reveals how critical 
rapid placement and strict enforcement of localized quarantine zones are critical to 
containing an FMD outbreak.   
 OALE policy should be amended to include a policy on Agroterrorism, which 
would outline roles and responsibilities associated with an FAD or other animal disease 
event. Agroterrorism training should be mandatory for all OALE sworn personnel. AWR-
151 should be required for all OALE sworn personnel and any FDACS personnel who 
may be tasked with responding to an animal disease outbreak. The more advanced 
courses AWR-152 and AWR-153 should be required for all investigators who may be 
assigned criminal investigative duties in an agroterrorism or animal disease event. OALE 
should engage in outreach with sheriff’s offices and other state agencies that may be 
called upon to assist in quarantine enforcements, to market the importance and 
availability of the AWR courses to these entities. With these changes and inclusions to 
policy and strategy, Florida would have an animal disease response capability on par with 
and exceeding the RRT concept, as recommended in the NIJ212280. 
The final issue was the cross conflict found in law enforcement agency roles and 
responsibilities in an agroterrorism event with OALE having statutory authorities over 
agriculture matters and FDLE having statutory authorities in terrorism related issues. This 
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could lead to ambiguity or even contention over who is responsible at an agroterrorism 
scene and who takes the lead role. The solution is to combine the two agencies, their 
statutory responsibilities, and their professional strengths. An MOU could be drafted and 
signed by FDLE and OALE acknowledging that a joint investigative team from the two 
agencies would respond in the event of an agroterrorism attack.  
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Create an intelligence and analysis unit within the Office of Agricultural Law 
Enforcement staffed with food and agriculture sector subject matter experts.  
o Assign a sector SME analyst from this unit to the Florida Fusion 
Center.   
o Assign a sworn investigator from this unit to the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force. 
o Unit responsibilities should include active engagement with the State 
Agriculture Response Team, the Florida Agriculture Crimes 
Intelligence Unit, and the Regional Domestic Security Task Forces to 
promote and facilitate interaction with the agriculture community and 
the exchange of information to identify threats to the food and 
agriculture sector. 
 
• Enact changes to Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
policies, standard operating procedures, and response plans for animal disease 
response events to incorporate an intrinsic criminal investigative and 
uniformed response component provided by the Office of Agricultural Law 
Enforcement.   
 
• Enact an Office of Agricultural Law Enforcement agroterrorism policy 
specifying the agencies roles and responsibilities in an agroterrorism event, as 
well as mandatory training requirements. 
 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The scope of this thesis has been intentionally narrow in focus to allow for a 
reasonable volume of research and analysis to be conducted in the time restraints of this 
program. There is so much more research to be done on the topic of the threat of 
agroterrorism in Florida. The threat primarily discussed in the context of this thesis was 
foot-and-mouth disease. However, there is far more to Florida’s agriculture landscape 
than livestock.   
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Research should be conducted into the threats to Florida’s citrus and crop 
industries, which remain tremendously vulnerable to diseases such as citrus canker and 
citrus greening, as well as pests such as MedFly and brown garden snail. As noted in the 
literature review, at one time the CIA investigated the possibility of citrus canker having 
been a product of a Cuban bioweapons program. In the smuggled food interdiction 
section this thesis touched briefly on food safety. Food safety and the threat of 
contamination within the food supply chain is a tremendously important and timely topic 
in homeland security. There are many different research possibilities just on this topic. 
Finally, there is future research available on the very basis for this thesis, the 
National Institutes of Justice study Defining Law Enforcement’s Role in Protecting 
American Agriculture from Agroterrorism. For the purposes of this thesis, it was accepted 
that this study was the only one of its kind, and thus served as a framework for defining 
the ideal capabilities for law enforcement in defending against agroterrorism. However, 
no indication was found that analysis has been done into the effectiveness of the study 
and its resulting initiatives. The study was completed in 2005, and it would be interesting 
to see an in-depth analysis into where those initiatives that were enacted in Kansas are ten 
years later, and what programs were most effective. 
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APPENDIX A. FLORIDA STATE STATUTE 570.03 
FSS 570.073, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, law 
enforcement officers: 
(1) The commissioner may create an Office of Agricultural Law 
Enforcement under the supervision of a senior manager exempt under s. 
110.205 in the Senior Management Service. The commissioner may 
designate law enforcement officers, as necessary, to enforce any criminal 
law or conduct any criminal investigation or to enforce the provisions of 
any statute or any other laws of this state. Officers appointed under this 
section shall have the primary responsibility for enforcing laws relating to 
agriculture and consumer services, as outlined 1in this section, and 2have 
jurisdiction over violations of law which threaten the overall security and 
safety of this state’s agriculture and consumer services. The primary 
responsibilities of officers appointed under this section include the 
enforcement of laws relating to the following: 
(a) Domesticated animals, including livestock, poultry, aquaculture 
products, and other wild or domesticated animals or animal products. 
(b) Farms, farm equipment, livery tack, citrus or citrus products, or 
horticultural products. 
(c) Trespass, littering, forests, forest fires, and open burning. 
(d) Damage to or theft of forest products. 
(e) Enforcement of a marketing order. 
(f) Protection of consumers. 
(g) Civil traffic offenses as 3provided in state law. 
(h) The use of alcohol or drugs which occurs on property owned, 
managed, or occupied by the department. 
(i) Any emergency situation in which the life, limb, or property of any 
person is placed in immediate and serious danger. 
(j) Any crime incidental to or related to paragraphs (a)-(i). 
4(k) The responsibilities of the Commissioner of Agriculture. 
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(2) Each law enforcement officer shall meet the qualifications of law 
enforcement officers under s. 943.13 and shall be certified as a law 
enforcement officer by the Department of Law Enforcement under the 
provisions of chapter 943. Upon certification, each law enforcement 
officer is subject to and shall have the same arrest and other authority 
provided for law enforcement officers generally in chapter 901 and shall 
have statewide jurisdiction. Each officer shall also have arrest authority as 
provided for state law enforcement officers in s. 901.15. Such officers 
have full law enforcement powers granted to other peace officers of this 
state, including the authority to make arrests, carry firearms, serve court 
process, and seize contraband and the proceeds of illegal activities. 
(3) The commissioner may also appoint part-time, reserve, or auxiliary 
law enforcement officers under chapter 943. 
(4) All department law enforcement officers, upon certification under s. 
943.1395, shall have the same right and authority to carry arms as do the 
sheriffs of this state. 
(5) Each law enforcement officer in the state who is certified pursuant to 
chapter 943 has the same authority as law enforcement officers designated 
in this section to enforce the laws of this state as described in subsection 
(1).270 
 
270. “Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Law Enforcement Officers,” F.S.S. Ch. 570.073, 2002, 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2011/570.073. 
 98 
                                                 
APPENDIX B. FLORIDA DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGIC 
PLAN, OBJECTIVES 3.1 AND 3.2 
OBJECTIVE 3.1 – CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: 
 
The risk to, vulnerability of, and consequence of attack to critical infrastructure 
are reduced through the identification and strategic protection of critical 
infrastructure as defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  
 
Step 1: Utilize the Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) to 
identify and prioritize critical infrastructure and key resources including systems 
and assets. Data should be regularly reviewed for accuracy and consistency.  
 
Step 2: Perform vulnerability assessments to validate the magnitude of harm 
that would result from loss of the asset, identify and rank asset vulnerabilities, 
and recommend actions to correct highly ranked vulnerabilities.  
 
Step 3: Identify protective measures that could be used to mitigate 
vulnerabilities identified during asset assessments.  
 
Step 4: Provide awareness training and outreach to government entities, private 
business, and citizens (pamphlets, news media, etc.) on personal and 
organizational responsibilities and methods to protect critical infrastructure/key 
resources.  
 
Step 5: Develop, maintain, utilize and improve a statewide warning system to 
alert the owners/managers of CI/KR assets of threat information redacted from 
intelligence sources normally unavailable to the general public.  
 
Step 6: Coordinate with owners/managers of critical infrastructure assets to 
ensure adequate emergency response and continuity of operations plans are in 
place and are regularly tested.  
 
Step 7: Provide hazard vulnerability assessments (HVAs) for hospitals that have 
not yet participated; summarize most common hospital vulnerabilities.  
 
Step 8: Provide appropriate training and access to the State’s CI/KR management 
tool to the first responder community and fusion centers throughout the 
state.271  
 
271. Ibid., 14–15. 
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OBJECTIVE 3.2 – FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SAFETY AND DEFENSE: 
 
Threats to food and agriculture safety and defense are identified, prevented, 
mitigated, and eradicated. Food and agriculture systems are protected from 
chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants and other hazards that affect 
the safety of food and agriculture products.  
 
Step 1: Assess the current status of food and agriculture emergency response 
plans and procedures available at the federal, state, regional, agency and private 
sector levels.  
 
Step 2: Develop additional plans and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with 
partner agencies and the private sector to address communication and/ 
or procedural gaps identified by the assessment process.  
 
Step 3: Coordinate and/or integrate federal, state, regional and agency food and 
agriculture alert, notification and information sharing processes to ensure that 
information about current vulnerabilities and threats is accessible to federal, 
state, regional and local government stakeholders. Mechanisms should also be 
established to enable the timely sharing of key information with private sector 
partners.  
 
Step 4: Develop, equip, train and exercise multi-agency, inter-disciplinary food 
and agriculture response and incident management teams with clearly-defined 
roles and responsibilities. Integrate these teams and their functions into federal, 
state, regional, and local response plans and procedures. Specific priorities 
include: the development of statewide and/or regional Food Emergency 
Response Team(s); providing resources that will allow Food Emergency Response 
Team(s) to support federal and state response activities; and development of 
incident management teams prepared to specifically respond to  
food and agriculture incidents.  
 
Step 5: Enhance and integrate food and agriculture databases with geospatial 
information, and improve data processes to allow sharing of multi-agency data 
and to facilitate near real-time use by first responders.  
 
Step 6: Ensure that threat, vulnerability and criticality assessments for food and 
agriculture critical infrastructure and key resources are completed, and that they 
are integrated into federal and state risk management programs. Develop 
methods for emergency assessment of food and agriculture facilities and 
systems in response to incidents and/or increased threats.272  
272. Ibid., 15–16. 
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APPENDIX C. AGROTERRORISM TRAININGS 
University of California–Davis Western Institute for Food Safety and Security 
DHS certified agroterrorism course descriptions: 
AWR-151 Understanding the Dangers of Agroterrorism is a 3.5 hour course that 
serves as an introductory course on the subject. The course covers an introduction to the 
agroterrorism threat and targets, an overview of the U.S. food chain system, an overview 
of the U.S. policies and protocols in place for agroterrorism, how an FAD scenario in the 
U.S. could unfold, and response to an FAD event.273  This appears to be a good 
introduction for any law enforcement personnel, other government, animal health, 
volunteers, or the general public to establish a general baseline of knowledge on the topic 
of agroterrorism, what it is, how the government plans for this scenario, and what the 
issues are. 
AWR-152 Principles of Preparedness for Agroterrorism and Food Systems 
Disasters is 6.5 hours and expands on the 151 course. The course begins with an 
introduction into agroterrorism preparedness, covers dissemination of WMD, detection 
and diagnosis, and immediate and long-term response strategies in an agroterrorism 
event. The course also includes sections covering identifying vulnerabilities and 
intelligence gathering as well as target hardening and mitigation strategies. This course 
expands and builds on the baseline established with the 151 course and has topics more 
focused on law enforcement and emergency responders to an agroterrorism event. The 
sections on vulnerabilities and intelligence could be useful for the agricultural 
intelligence analyst. The sections on target hardening and mitigation strategies should be 
applicable to the critical infrastructure planner or other personnel tasked with evaluating 
properties and facilities in the food and agriculture sector.274 
273. “Understanding the Dangers of Agroterrorism:  Participant Guide,” Western Institute for Food Safety & 
Security, accessed August 7, 2014. http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6465. 
274. “Principles of Preparedness for Agroterrorism and Food Systems Disasters,” Western Institute for Food 
Safety & Security, accessed August 7, 2014. http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6615. 
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AWR-153 Principles of Detection and Diagnosis – Strategies and Technologies is 
the next in the series and is a 4.5-hour course. This course focuses on detection and 
diagnosis, diagnostic methods, handling of samples, investigation of the event, and 
terrorism vs. naturally occurring events. This course is aimed at the response teams going 
into ground zero of an agroterrorism FAD disaster and would be good for the law 
enforcement investigator who has the potential to respond to this type of event.275 
AWR-154 Principles of National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a 5-
hour course covering exactly what the title implies. The course reviews NIMS and ICS in 
the context of a food and agriculture sector incident.276  The applicability of this course 
to law enforcement in Florida is limited as NIMS and ICS training are required and 
provided already. However, this course could be useful for those non-sworn personnel 
who may respond to an agroterrorism event and would be applicable to those members of 
agriculture specific Incident Command or Incident Management Teams (IMT). The same 
could be said for AWR-155 Principles of Frontline Response to Agroterrorism and Food 
System Disasters which builds on the 154 course to cover the Unified Command in this 
type of incident.277 
AWR-156 Principles of Planning and Implementing Recovery is a 6-hour course 
covering long term planning and recovery as the title implies. The course also discusses 
leadership, operations, finance, and crisis communications. This course is specifically 
aimed at an audience who would be involved in long term, large-scale planning and 
recovery efforts. The audience would be in the higher levels of government, the Incident 
Command, and the agriculture sector. This course is not designed for law enforcement.278 
275. “Principles of Detection and Diagnosis – Strategies and Technologies,” Western Institute for Food Safety & 
Security, August 7, 2014. http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6601. 
276. “Principles of National Incident Management System (NIMS),” Western Institute for Food Safety & 
Security, accessed August 7, 2014, https://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6609&preview=true. 
277. “Principles of Frontline Response to Agroterrorism and Food System Disasters,” Western Institute for Food 
Safety & Security, accessed August 7, 2014, http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6615. 
278. “Principles of Planning and Implementing Recovery,” Western Institute for Food Safety & Security, accessed 
August 7, 2014, http://www.wifss.ucdavis.edu/?page_id=6623. 
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